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SUMMARY
Computer systems on today’s Internet are subject to a range of attacks that can
compromise their intended operation. Attackers are motivated by economic incentives to
perform denial of service (DoS) attacks, distribute unsolicited advertisements, and harvest
identity information. In order to defend against these attacks, much work has been done on
intrusion detection systems (IDS) that try to detect and stop attacks before damage occurs.
IDSs have certain false positive and false negative ratios that determine their effectiveness
in practical usage, and they are traditionally classified into signature-based and anomaly-
based systems. Signature-based IDSs focus on signatures of known malware, or malicious
software. Anomaly-based IDSs focus on detecting deviations from expected behavior based
on a learning algorithm applied during normal usage. In this work, we present a third
classification of IDSs, which we call integrity-based IDSs. Integrity-based IDSs monitor a
system to ensure that it does not deviate from a known good state.
We investigate how integrity-based IDSs can be used to build self-healing computer sys-
tems that automatically recover from known and unknown attacks, minimizing the damage
that is done by the attack. We believe that integrity-based IDSs can have low false positive
and false negative ratios that approach zero. Further, we show that layers in the system can
be used to isolate the self-healing monitor from the production system in order to guarantee
protection of the monitor without sacrificing significant performance.
Our approach is to build self-healing systems that are equipped with an intrusion re-
covery system (IRS). The intrusion recovery system consists of an integrity-based intrusion
detection system, a statehold that contains the known good state, and a recovery mecha-
nism. The goal of the intrusion recovery system is to identify known and unknown attacks




Computer systems on the Internet are targeted from a variety of attacks that can com-
promise their intended operation. Once the system has been compromised, it is difficult
to re-establish trust in the system. Computer systems have network, data, storage, and
processing resources that are valuable to an attacker. When an attacker gains access to
these resources, his or her goal can be to covertly retain access. These resources can be
used to distribute malicious network traffic, harvest sensitive information, store illegal or
malicious content, and process malicious jobs. The most conventional method to recover
from such a compromise is to wipe the system clean and reinstall from known good media.
We investigate how an attacker can try to retain covert access, present a more robust system
architecture, and investigate alternative methods of recovery based on our architecture. Our
methods may be more more efficient, timely, and economical in many situations.
1.1 Motivation
Host computer security has followed an intuitive trend since the dawn of computing. At first,
security concerns were not a priority when designing computer systems as there were few
users and they could be trusted not to perform malicious activity. With respect to security,
physical security was the biggest concern. As computer systems became more networked,
more people gained access to various systems, and so trust became more important. During
this time, significant malicious activity increased. At first, most of the activity was benign
in motivation; however, the activity was inadvertently costly to organizations (e.g. worms).
At present, more emphasis has been put on security. Systems have been deployed with more
advanced security mechanisms configured with complex security policies in order to prevent
unauthorized use of computer resources. However, it is often easily possible to bypass
complex security mechanisms and policies, especially if they are not configured properly or
1
if vulnerabilities exists.
The first viruses and worms sparked a significant increase in computer security awareness
and interest. An important research outcome during this time was intrusion detection
systems (IDSs), which is a system that can detect when a computer has been compromised
[28]. Presently, IDSs have increased to widespread use at both the host and network level.
Some work has been done on intrusion prevention systems (IPS) that try to prevent unknown
attacks [60, 26]. Most related to our work is intrusion tolerant systems (ITS), which argue
that attacks are inevitable and systems should be designed to tolerate attacks [53]. For the
foreseeable future, compromised systems will continue to be a problem. Our work focuses
on how to recover from an attack once it has occurred. We term our system an intrusion
recovery system (IRS) because it is able to detect attacks and recover from them. Although
we focus on recovery from rootkits, a specific type of malicious attack, the broader scope of
our work entails a model that can recover from many types of attacks.
1.2 Contributions
Our work has studied building self-healing computer systems that can recover from attacks.
We have specifically focused our work on recovery from rootkits. With this focus, we have
developed a trustworthy computer system architecture suitable for commodity operating
systems. We have made many contributions that relate to self-healing, intrusion detection,
secure architectures, and rootkits. Below is a list of the major contributions of this work:
• Self-Healing Systems – We have investigated systems that are able to detect and recover
from attacks. We have shown that it is possible to build systems that can recover from
known and unknown attacks.
• Rootkit Classification – We have classified rootkits into user-level, kernel-level, device-
level, and other-level. Most publicly known rootkits can be classified as either user-level
or kernel-level rootkits. We have also developed a classification for rootkits that will
target devices and rootkits that target other abstractions in future systems.
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• Integrity – Most previous IDS work has focused on signature or anomaly-based ap-
proaches. We have shown that IDSs can also use an integrity-based approach in which
a compromise can be discovered by detecting that the integrity of the system is no
longer intact.
• Virtual Layer Architecture – We have developed a layered architecture that is suitable
for intrusion detection and recovery. We have used this architecture in our design of
a self-healing computer system.
• Dynamic Control Flow Graph – We have presented a new method for dynamically trac-
ing the control flow graph of a process. This method can be used to detect deviations
from accepted paths of execution.
• Prototype Implementation and Testing – We have implemented a prototype of the
designed system. We have also tested our prototype to verify the effectiveness of our
design.
We have tested our methods against a test suite of 10 user-level and 10 kernel-level
rootkits. The system is able to recover from all rootkit installations within minutes after
installation. The prototype intrusion recovery system incurs a performance penalty of about
30% worse performance than a normal system.
1.3 Outline
Chapter 2 provides background information on the compromise problem including a defini-
tion of some important terms. Additionally, an overview of key related research is discussed.
Chapter 3 provides a survey of current rootkits that are known to exist and some dis-
cussion of future types of rootkit attacks. This discussion of existing and future rootkits
enables an understanding of how to recover from the installation of rootkits.
Chapter 4 provides a discussion of methods for recovery from rootkits. These methods
form the basis for our intrusion recovery system.
Chapter 5 introduces a model for an intrusion recovery system. A virtual layered ar-
chitecture is presented that is more robust than widespread commodity operating system
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architectures. We provide a discussion of each layer and present a detailed study of the layer
that resides just below the production system.
Chapter 6 presents an evaluation of the model by testing a prototype against a rep-
resentative suite of attacks. Although the prototype is not optimized, some performance
evaluation of the system is investigated, so that a trade-off between system performance loss
and increased reliability can be accessed.




Computer systems today are very complex and highly accessible to attackers. In the early
days of the Internet, it was common for an attacker to take over a computer system in order
to achieve fame among his or her peers. However, on today’s Internet and for the foreseeable
future, attacker’s are often motivated by economical, political, or religious motives. Below
is a list of possible uses of computer systems based on these motives.
• Information dispersion — An attacker may wish to disperse large volumes of informa-
tion. The most notable case today is known as spam in which unsolicited email is sent
out to numerous addresses in order to reach a large audience for some reason such as
to advertise a product.
• Illegal content sharing — An attacker may wish to share illegal content. Such content
may include copyrighted software, movies, and music. It is desirable to take over
another computer for the purpose of sharing this content as the attacker does not
want his own identity known.
• Information harvesting — An attacker may wish to obtain information from the user
of the system. This information may include banking information, social security
numbers, classified information, and so on.
• Denial of service — An attacker may wish to stop service to a computer or group of
computers. There are various means to deny service to a computer system. One of
the most widely used methods is a distributed denial of service using large clusters of
systems to overwhelm a system.
• Selling resources — An attacker may want to take over a large number of systems,
commonly referred to as a botnet today, for the purpose of selling the resources offered
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by those systems.
In addition to damages incurred from an attack, recovering a system after an attack
can be costly. Once an attacker has taken over a system, it is difficult to trust the system.
The attacker may have tampered with the integrity of the system. Traditionally, the best
method to recover from an attack is to wipe the system clean and reinstall. We believe that
alternative methods of recovery should be investigated. Specifically, there are two important
elements of recovery:
1. Checking integrity — In order to recover from an attack, it must be possible to realize
that an attack has occurred. There must be a means of checking the current integrity of
the system for correctness. An important part of integrity checking is to ensure that the
mechanism that checks the system’s integrity is not compromised itself. Furthermore,
if the integrity is breached and must be restored, it is important to check the integrity
after restoration to ensure that the system state is once again intact.
2. Restoring integrity — In the event that an attack has occurred, there must be a method
to recover from the attack and to restore the integrity of the system. An important
part of restoring integrity is that a copy of the known good state must be kept isolated
from the attacker.
In this work, we assume an attacker will tamper with the integrity of the system. This
is not true for every attack. Consider a social engineering attack in which the attacker is
able to gain a legitimate user’s password. The attacker may log into the system, retrieve
information, and leave without modifying the integrity of the system. These type of attacks
are important classes of attacks; however, we do not address these attacks in this work.
The installation of a rootkit will tamper with the integrity of the system. The purpose
of a rootkit is to retain access to a system. Often, an attacker will install a rootkit onto
a system that he or she has compromised. A rootkit will not allow an attacker to gain
unauthorized access to a system that he has not already gained access to by some other
means. An important observation of a rootkit is that it will hide the attacker’s activities by
altering the system.
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In this work, we focus on recovery from rootkit installations. In particular, we explore
automated methods of recovery. Below is a description of the notation used in our defini-
tions. Following the notation, we provide a short detail of our computer system model and
definitions of important terms. Finally, we conclude this chapter with a discussion of related
work.
2.1 Notation
In this work we propose an architecture in which the production system runs inside a virtual
machine. A system monitor runs in an isolated machine. A virtual machine monitor (VMM)
is used to isolate the monitor from the production machine. We define some notation in
terms of computer state.
Specifically, we can describe the integrity of the system in terms of state. State can
be either mostly static or dynamic. Static state is state that should not change frequently.
Dynamic state is state that should change frequently. For instance, the core kernel code
should be static whereas data structures that the kernel uses are dynamic. We distinguish
between static and dynamic state with subscripts 1 and 2 respectively. For example, Γ1
represents static state of the known good state and Γ2 represents the dynamic state of the
known good state. Further, a subscript of k represents kernel-level state and a subscript of
u represents user-level state.
• ω represents the current state of the physical system including the virtual machine
monitor (VMM) and guest system in a virtual environment.
• σ represents the current state of the operating system or the guest system in a virtual
environment. This state would be the same as ω in a non-virtual environment.
• λ represents state that is isolated from σ, yet processes existing in this state have
visibility and control over σ.
• Γ represents the set of known good states for the system. In the virtual environment,



















Figure 1: Model of computer system
• α represents state that is produced by an attacker’s activities.
• ρ represents state associated with an attacker’s rootkit.
• ∆ represents a difference between two rootkits.
2.2 Computer System Model
We model the computer system as shown in Figure 1. There are two modes of operation:
kernel-level and user-level. The kernel and modules that run at the kernel-level have complete
access to the machine. Kernel-level code, existing in state σk, has direct access to the
hardware and visibility of all of kernel space and all of user space. User-level code, existing
in state σu, has direct access to its own state but depends on the kernel for access to other
state, such as the hardware, based on security mechanisms and policies.
2.3 Terms
2.3.1 Integrity
Integrity means that the state of the system is intact and has not been tampered with in a
malicious manner. Integrity, denoted i, is defined to be any subset of the known good state.
Integrity is defined to be
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i = σ : σ ∈ Γ (1)



















σk1 : σk1 ∈ Γk1
σk2 : σk2 ∈ Γk2
σu1 : σu1 ∈ Γu1
σu2 : σu2 ∈ Γu2
. (2)
An important assumption for defining integrity is that the range of known good state is
known. For static states, one can reason that this is feasible. However, the range of known
good dynamic states, such as σk2 , it is more difficult to describe the range of known good
states. We propose some methods to monitor static and dynamic state.
2.3.2 Compromised System
When an attacker has gained some level of unauthorized access on a computer system, the
system is said to be compromised. If the attacker gains unrestricted access, known as root
access, the compromise is considered a root-level compromise. With root-level privileges, the
attacker can change any state within the system. For instance, the attacker can modify the
system so that the original reporting processes no longer reports accurate information. We
can define a compromised system, denoted as c, in terms of the known good state as
c = σ : σ /∈ Γ (3)










































σk1 : σk1 /∈ Γk1
or
σk2 : σk2 /∈ Γk2
or
σu1 : σu1 /∈ Γu1
or
σu2 : σu2 /∈ Γu2
. (4)
So, if the current state of the system is not in the set of known good states, then the
system is said to be compromised such that c 6= i. This is only a partial definition because
the reverse is not necessarily true. If the current state of the system is i, it is not certain
that the machine is not compromised as it is possible that the integrity of the system has
not been altered. In this work, however, we are interested in the class of systems where the
integrity of the system has been tampered with such that σ /∈ Γ.
2.3.3 Rootkit
Once an attacker has gained unauthorized access to a system, he or she will often use a
rootkit as a tool to covertly retain access to that system. A rootkit is a set of utilities
that allow the attacker to retain access and hide activities, which will diminish trust in the
system.
We classify rootkits into user-level and kernel-level rootkits. A user-level rootkit will
alter operating system tools that run in user mode (e.g. modify system binaries such as
/bin/login). A kernel-level rootkit will modify the kernel (e.g. system calls). A rootkit
is said to be the state ρ that compromises the integrity of the system. If the system is
compromised with a rootkit, then the following is a description of the state of the system:
c = i ∧ ρ ∧ α. (5)
However, an ideal rootkit will hide itself so that if the system reads its own state, it will
read it as being in state i such that i is defined as follows:
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i = i ∨ (ρ ∧ 0) ∨ (α ∧ 0) = i. (6)
2.3.4 Trust
We use Charles Pfleeger’s and Shari Pfleeger’s definition of trust with respect to computer
security [52]. Their definition says that a system is trusted if we have confidence that it
provides the following four services in a consistent and effective manner:
• memory protection
• file protection
• general object access control
• user authentication
We are interested in maintaining trust in the system. If a compromise occurs, then none
of the above services can be guaranteed until recovery action has occurred. Our intrusion
recovery system must be able to re-establish trust in the system.
2.3.5 Virtual Machine
A virtual machine is an machine abstraction on top of a physical machine. A VMM runs on
the physical machine and partitions the resources of the physical machine into one or more
guest machines [57, 54]. Each guest machine is designed to be completely isolated from the
physical machine and other guest machines. Examples of virtual machine implementation
include VMWare, L4, Xen, and UML [15, 8, 18, 14]. Virtual machines enable state λ that
is isolated from the guest system state σ but has complete visibility of σ.
2.3.6 Honeynet
A honeypot is a network resource whose value lies in illicit use of that resource, and a
honeynet is a network of honeypots. Honeynets are used to study the tools, tactics, and
motives of attackers [58]. We use a honeynet to capture real-world compromises in order to
help test our recovery techniques [46].
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2.3.7 Self-Healing System
A self-healing system is a system that is capable of automatically recovering from known
and unknown attacks. An ideal self-healing system would be able to detect any attack,
determine the full extent of the attack, undo any state changes caused by the attack, and
prevent further similar attacks. A self-healing system should be able to detect that the
system is in state c and restore it to state i.
2.4 Related Work
2.4.1 Intrusion Detection
Forrest et al. have studied anomalous behavior of systems based on a learning period. Their
work focuses on user-level applications in which they monitor the sequences of system calls
requested by an application [33, 32, 66, 34]. Their methods use a learning period to learn
how a program is expected to execute and behave. They focus on user-level applications
by monitoring sequences of systems calls that are part of the operating system and assume
that the kernel will not be compromised. Some work has demonstrated mimicry techniques
as a tactic used by attackers to counter the work of behavior models [65].
Kiriansky et al. describe a method of program shepherding in which control flow transfers
are monitored by the operating system and compared against security policies [43]. Their
method uses an interpreter, which interprets all flows of execution prior to executing and
only permits execution if a policy allows. The translated acceptable paths of execution are
cached in order to achieve better performance.
As opposed to tracking the flow of execution, Suh et al. present a method for tracking
the information flow in a system [59]. Their method demonstrates how to build a security
mechanism that can track the source of information flows and tag them as spurious based
on security policies. The operating system can specify certain policies that prevent a set
of specific operations from spurious information. They show how a simple policy can be
implemented to prevent such attacks as buffer overflows.
Recent work has been done on static binary analysis [36, 31, 64] to build models of
program behavior for intrusion detection. The statically derived model can be used to
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restrict the programs behavior during run-time. Work in static analysis claims to have low
false positive rates. However, some programs are designed so that static analysis is very
hard in order to prevent reverse engineering, so static models for these programs will likely
not be effective.
The main problems with intrusion detection are false positives and false negatives.
Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems suffer from false positives and false negatives
because the behavior of the system may not stay within the learned boundaries. Signature-
based intrusion detection systems suffer from false positives and false negatives because the
known bad signatures may not be complete.
2.4.2 Modeling and Understanding Rootkits
Thimbleby, Anderson, and Cairns developed a mathematical framework to model Trojan
Horses (Trojans), and viruses [61]. A Trojan is similar to a rootkit in that both are designed
to go unnoticed from the computer’s legitimate users. Thimbleby et al. state that the
detecting a Trojan is at least as difficult as determining whether or not two functions are
equal; however this detection of Trojans is more difficult than our detection of rootkits
because we assume that a good state is previously known.
Further, Thimbleby et al. discuss a virus that could infect a system querying program
in such a way that the querying program itself would be unable to detect that it was
infected. Such an infection is possible with kernel-level rootkits. When a kernel-level rootkit
is installed, tools that check the kernel to see if a rootkit is installed are relying on the
infected program itself. So, the kernel-level rootkit can return false information to the tools
so that the tools report that the system is intact. This is why we propose a VM based
architecture.
Other research has been conducted on developing a methodology for characterizing rootk-
its [45, 44]. The methodology to characterize rootkits involves determining the ∆ between
a baseline system and a system compromised with a user-level or kernel-level rootkit. The
∆ is used to characterize rootkits based on checksums, number of files replaced, number of
files added, user level verses kernel level, penetration into the kernel, and so forth. This
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methodology can be used to determine if two rootkits are distinguishable. We build upon
this methodology to develop a survey of rootkits.
The National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre for the United Kingdom has
published a report on Trojans and rootkits that discusses detection, remediation, and pre-
vention of rootkits [16]. Their report describes rootkits as Remote Access Tools (RATs) that
provide the attacker with a backdoor into the compromised system. The report discusses
some of the functionality of RATs, which includes: monitoring system activities (i.e. watch
users keystrokes and monitor users), monitor network traffic, use system resources, modify
files, relay email (i.e. spam).
2.4.3 Detecting Rootkits
The open source and hacker communities have developed various tools to detect and pre-
vent compromises, which include: chkrootkit [2], kern_check [6], CheckIDT [40], and Saint
Michael [13]. The chkrootkit tool is a script that checks systems for signs of rootkits. The
chkrootkit script can detect many rootkits including both user-level rootkits and kernel-
level rootkits, however some rootkits may evade detection because the chkrootkit script
relies upon pattern matching to look for signs of known rootkits. The kern_check tool is
used to detect kernel-level rootkits. The kern_check tool compares the addresses of system
calls as defined in the System.map file, generated at kernel compile time, to the current
addresses of system calls. The CheckIDT tool is a user-level program that can read and
restore the interrupt descriptor table, of which the 0x80th entry points to the system call
handler. The tools that check the integrity of the kernel rely on the kernel and so may in
fact not provide accurate results.
Saint Michael is a kernel module that monitors the ktext (kernel code in memory) for
modifications and attempts to recover from any modification to running kernel code. If
an attacker installs a certain class of kernel-level rootkits on a system equipped with Saint
Michael, the system may be able to recover from the rootkit. After installation of the rootkit,
Saint Michael will overwrite the rootkit modifications with the original trusted code. One
drawback of Saint Michael is that it resides within the kernel and so is not isolated and
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protected.
Other work has been conducted towards detecting compromises. Kim and Spafford show
how a file system integrity checker, tripwire, can be used to monitor files for corruption,
change, addition, and deletion [41]. In addition to other uses, tripwire can notify system
administrators that system binaries have changed. Tripwire must establish a baseline for a
known good file system. To establish a baseline, tripwire takes a hash (e.g. MD5, CRC,
Snefru) of the files at a known good point. The baseline can be used for comparison at later
points in time. A binary-level rootkit will replace system binaries, which will set off the “trip
wire” and alert the administrator. However, a rootkit designer can counteract tripwire by
breaking trust in the reporting tools upon which tripwire relies (e.g. redirect system calls).
Some other recent work has been conducted verifying the integrity of the system. Petroni
et al. have designed Copilot, which consists of a PCI add-in card that is capable of scanning
the hosts memory [39]. Their work focuses on detection of kernel-level rootkits and reporting
any events to a monitoring station via an interface on the PCI card. They state that there are
two categories of kernel-level rootkit detectors, which are those that check the consistency
of output based on input and those that check kernel memory. Their card has the ability to
check kernel memory from an isolated vantage point. They report a 1% performance penalty
is incurred in order to detect a kernel-level rootkit within 30 seconds. The advantages of
their approach include that they can achieve hard isolation with hardware, do not need to
modify the operating system, and do not sacrifice much performance. The disadvantages
of their approach include the need for specialized hardware, the lack of visibility inside the
OS, and the lack of visibility of CPU registers.
2.4.4 Forensics
Another area of related work is in forensics in which methods are developed to analyze
systems to determine how they were compromised. King and Chen implemented a framework
for tracing the entry point of an intrusion called BackTracker [42]. BackTracker logs events
for three operating system objects: processes, files, and filenames. Moreover, it keeps track
of dependencies among those system events, which reflect how these events affect each
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other. An administrator can manually trace back through the logs to determine the point of
entry. After a compromise has been detected, e.g. by an altered file, a human investigator
runs analysis tools offline on the logged data. The result is a graph of objects and their
dependencies that can be backtracked from the detection point to the entry point. The
logging added a 9% performance overhead and generated 1.2GB of data per day under an
intensive workload [42]. One problem with this work that still needs to be solved is that a
human analyst is needed in order to analyze an attack.
2.4.5 Recovery
Candea et al. have discussed the possibility of building systems that are designed to recover
rather than building systems designed to never fail [24]. They term such computing recovery
oriented computing (ROC). They present the following equation for availability in terms of





Given that systems will inevitably fail, they point out that the availability of systems
could be increased if we reduce the MTTR. Two methods of recovery that the ROC group
has introduced include microreboots [30] and system undo capability [22]. A microreboot
restarts only portions of the system that have failed as opposed to restarting the whole
system. System undo provides the ability to undo operations not only at the application
level but for the entire system including the operating system.
2.4.6 Hypervisors
In early literature, much work on operating system architecture focused on performance,
flexibility, and extensibility. Security has also been discussed mostly focused on safety. The
exokernel was an operating system designed around building a small programmable machine
on top of the hardware so that mechanisms provided by the machine could be exported
and not policy [29]. These goals are close to what we desire for our architecture. The
SPIN architecture provides a monolithic approach for flexibility [19]. SPIN is an interesting
research project in that it forces security by the Modula-3 compiler, but a more complete
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implementation is needed in order to test its practical applications. Although many have
argued that a µ-kernel cannot compete with a monolithic kernel in terms of performance,
Liedtke argues that such arguments may be based on results from improper implementations
[48]. Open source implementations of Liedtke’s proposed L4 architecture are available along
with ported versions of the Linux kernel that run on top of the L4 µ-kernel [4, 9].
In Liedtke’s µ-kernel work, he defines three concepts that a µ-kernel must provide. These
concepts are address space, threads and interprocess communication, and unique identifiers.
For address space, the µ-kernel should provide grant, map, and flush operations in order to
achieve good flexibility. Interprocess communication has made fast µ-kernel implementations
difficult, but Liedtke argues that fast interprocess communication can be achieved.
Although virtual machines were originally researched as early as the 1960’s [37], recent
attention has again focused on virtual machines [63, 67, 54, 57]. Hardware manufacturers
are beginning to support virtualization in hardware citing workload isolation, consolidation,
and migration as reasons to virtualize [63]. Virtualization efforts on x86 based machines
have proven to be difficult and provide low performance. Whitaker et al. have addresses
performance issues with the concept of paravirtualization where virtual hardware differs
from the underlying hardware [67]
Xen is a recent virtual machine monitor work, which uses the concept of paravirtualiza-
tion [18]. Like traditional virtual machine monitors, Xen allows multiple commercial guest
operating systems to run concurrently on a single server. Xen provides the hardware abstrac-
tion on which the operating system runs. This includes providing abstractions for memory
management, CPU resources and device I/O. Since the x86 hardware was not designed to
provide for this abstraction, Xen must provide the ability to deal with certain privileged
instructions. This means that a minimal amount of coding is necessary to port the OS to
the Xen environment. Application level binaries are not affected. Different OS instances
are protected from each other and cannot affect Xen, which provides isolation. One of the
important goals of Xen is to optimize performance. For instance, Xen exists in the top 64MB
of every address space in order to avoid TLB flushes every time a process enters or returns
from the hypervisor. Further, unlike traditional virtual machine monitors (VMMs), in order
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to execute privileged instructions, processes issues hypercalls to the hypervisor, which is
similar to a system call.
2.4.7 Security Architectures
With the advent of recent research in virtual machines, many have applied virtual machines
to security. Litty suggest the use of a hypervisor for an intrusion detection system [49], and
we build upon the idea for our work. Arbaugh et al. demonstrate how a system can be
booted in a secure and reliable manner through the use of cryptography hash checks for
each layer from the BIOS until the system is operational [17]. This approach builds uses
integrity chaining, assuming that the hardware is correct, to verify each layer in the system
as it boots up.
Terra is a virtual machine based architecture that suggests applications should be run in
different compartments so that they cannot tamper with each others resources [35]. Open-
box virtual machines are available to run any OS similar to existing virtual machine (VM)
architectures and allow full visibility into the system. Closed-box VMs allow no visibility
into the instance by anyone who has not been given explicit access to do so. The main
notion of Terra is towards compartmentalized security. The drawback of compartmentalized
security is that the system is less flexible.
2.4.8 Self-Healing Software
Some work has been done on fault tolerant software that has the ability to cope with
both programming bugs and malicious attacks. Locasto et al. introduce the concept of
an Application Community, in which distributed homogeneous applications work together
in order to detect zero day flaws or attacks [51]. Demsky and Rinard have developed methods
to automatically repair data structures during error conditions [27]. Sidiroglou et al. have
developed methods to gracefully cope with either malicious or benign software errors by
using an instruction-level emulator.
Our work is similar to the self-healing software work in that we allow for some tolerance
in the operating system. We combine a small and secure hypervisor with a host integrity-
based intrusion detection system in order to build a more reliable computer. As opposed to
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just detecting an intrusion, we also have developed methods to recover from an intrusion.
Since we focus our work on rootkits, it is important to understand how to detect rootkits
in order to recover from rootkits. Based on our understanding of rootkits, we are able to




Rootkits are a fairly recent phenomenon and have only been around since the early 1990’s
[38]. The term root stems from the traditional Unix user with complete access to a system or
more generally the system administrator. The term root can be applied to other operating
systems such as Microsoft Windows where Administrator access is the equivalent of root.
The goal of a rootkit is to retain root access to a system in a covert manner so that the system
administrator is unaware of illicit access and usage. The first rootkits used simple techniques
to hide files and processes, but their technology has continued to increase in sophistication as
time progresses and security professionals develop better methods to detect rootkits. In this
chapter, we will give an overview of different methods that have been used by rootkits and
also discuss some new methods we expect to see in the future from rootkits. We generalize
our discussion to all modern operating systems but focus specific details on Linux based
operating systems.
Rootkits are toolkits designed to replace operating system functionality so that some
state in the system can be hidden from the computer system users. For example, a rootkit
may replace a binary program ls with a malicious version of the program that hides files
whose filename end with “.hideme”. For our definition of a rootkit, we say that a rootkit
must replace some code that is part of the operating system or state in the computer system.
Rootkits are related to Trojans in their design to deceive a user. Therefore, it is interest-
ing to examine characteristics of Trojans when studying rootkits. A Trojan is a seemingly
trustworthy execution path or executable that has a malicious side effect. A user could, for
example, install a game believing that the game is not malicious, but the game installs a
keystroke logger as a malicious side effect. Both Trojans and rootkits are designed to be
undetectable to the user. Thimbleby et al. use a wide definition of Trojans that describes
characteristics of Trojans that are similar to rootkits [61]. They categorize Trojans into
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direct masquerades, simple masquerades, slip masquerades, and environmental masquerades.
Here is a summary of their categorizations with examples of similar rootkit functionality as
appropriate:
• Direct masquerades – These malicious programs pretend to be normal programs. For
example, /bin/ls could be replaced with a malicious /bin/ls that does not list all files
as specified.
• Simple masquerades – These malicious programs do not appear to be normal programs
but instead appear to be a program that they are not. We do not classify this type of
malware, or malicious software, as being part of a rootkit.
• Slip masquerades – These malicious programs pretend to be a possible normal program
and exhibit characteristics similar to normal programs. For example, an attacker may
create a program named login2 in order to pretend to be related to the login program.
We do not classify this type of malware as being part of a rootkit.
• Environmental masquerades – These malicious programs are indirectly invoked by the
user. For example, the kernel is indirectly invoked by the user in order to bootup the
system. The sys_getdents system call in the kernel could be replaced with a malicious
sys_getdents system call that hides certain directory entries.
In our work, we are primarily interested in direct masquerades and environmental mas-
querades. These types of masquerades will modify programs that users directly and indi-
rectly execute in order to hide activities of the attacker. In this chapter, we provide a survey
of rootkits that use the techniques of direct masquerades and environmental masquerades.
However, at the top level classification, we classify rootkits in terms of the execution space
that they modify. We classify rootkits into user-level, kernel-level, device-level, other-level,
and hybrid rootkits as seen in Figure 2.
3.1 User-Level Rootkit Definition
User-level rootkits are the earliest form of rootkits. A rootkit is considered a user-level





Figure 2: Classification of rootkits
system functions operate in user mode. In Unix or Linux based systems, for example, direc-
tory listings, process listings, and network connection listings can be seen from a terminal
by executing user space programs such as ls, ps, and netstat. Many of the early rootkits
were user-level rootkits that replaced user space programs. An attacker can store hidden
files on a compromised system by replacing the ls program. A malicious ls program can
easily be created that filters file listings based on filenames that match a pattern of the at-
tacker’s choosing. There are many user space programs that the attacker can target. Table
1 provides a list of common targets with descriptions based on Linux manual pages [10].
For many programs listed in Table 1, there is a direct relationship between the func-
tionality of the program and a goal of an attacker designing a rootkit. For example, if an
attacker would like to hide processes, then the attacker can replace the ps executable with a
malicious copy that filters output based on preset rules. A more interesting program to mod-
ify is ifconfig. An attacker will often modify the ifconfig so that the user cannot determine
that a local interface is in promiscuous mode. Often, an attacker may wish to set a network
interface in promiscuous mode so that he or she can learn more information about nearby
hosts. Another popular target has traditionally been the login program. An attacker can
modify this program so that he or she can later enter the system with root-level privileges
by typing a preset username and password. By understanding the goal of the attacker, it is
easy to understand which files the attacker would like to target.
More knowledge is needed in order to understand why some of the utilities in table
1 are modified by rootkit developers. For instance, the md5sum is a target replaced by
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Table 1: List of user-level rootkit program targets
Program File Description
atd Job executor that executes jobs scheduled by at
chattr Change file attributes for ext2 file system
chfn Change real username and information
chsh Change login shell
dir List directory contents
du Estimate file space usage
find Search for files in a directory hierarchy
ifconfig Configure a network interface
init First process in Linux that is the parent of all processes
in.telnetd Implementation of telnet daemon
kill Send a signal to a process
locate List files in file system database that match a pattern
login Begin session on the system
ls List directory contents
lsof List open files
md5sum Generate or check MD5 message digests
netstat Print network connections, routing tables, interface information, etc
ps Report a snapshot of the current processes
pstree Display a tree of processes
read Read from a file descriptor
sshd Server end of secure communication mechanism between two hosts
su Change user ID or become super-user
syslogd Linux system logging utilities
tcpd Access control facility for Internet services
top Display Linux tasks
write Send a message to another user
an attacker. The reason rootkit developers began replacing the md5sum binary is because
system administrators began using md5sum to verify the checksums of their system utilities.
A system administrator could run md5sum on all system utilities just after installation and
then check the integrity of those utilities at a later date, again using md5sum, by examining
the current hash values. If a user-level rootkit had replaced utilities on the computer prior
to the integrity check, then the system administrator would be able to detect the presence
of the rootkit. Therefore, rootkit developers have become motivated to replace the md5sum
binary as well. A malicious version of md5sum would report false hash values of utilities
that had been replaced by the rootkit.
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Table 2: List of kernel targets for a kernel-level rootkit
Kernel Subsystem Description
System calls Interface to system information for user processes
Virtual file system Generic file system interface
Network stack Network functionality
Scheduler Mechanism to schedule processes
Kernel modules Ability to insert new kernel functionality
Interrupt handlers Handles hardware and software interrupts
Drivers Controls the hardware in the computer system
Entire kernel Entire kernel could be redirected
Kernel backdoor An independent machine running in the kernel
3.2 Kernel-Level Rootkit Definition
Kernel-level rootkits are rootkits that modify the kernel. Many different structures and
functions in the kernel can be redirected to malicious versions. Table 2 offers a list of kernel
targets for kernel-level rootkits. As seen in the list, any kernel subsystem could be the target
of a kernel-level rootkit. System calls have been the most widely used target due to their
versatile nature. Interrupt handlers including the page fault handler have also been targeted.
One interesting possibility that we have not seen is to redirect the entire kernel to a different
kernel. Another interesting possibility is to insert a completely independent machine in the
kernel that is accessible from a remote network connection. Using this method, the attacker
could use the resources of the computer in his or her own machine and have complete access
to the target system.
To better understand how a kernel-level rootkit can target the kernel and the level of
flexibility offered, we have studied how the system call table can be targeted. Below are
three possible ways to target the system call table:
• Entry Redirection — Redirects individual system calls within the system call table.
Modifies original system call table.
• Entry Overwrite — Overwrites individual system call code. Does not modify original
system call table.


























































(c) Overwrite individual system call code
Figure 3: Current rootkit methods to Trojan system call table
system call table.
Figure 3(a) shows how a kernel-level rootkit can redirect individual system calls within
the system call table (SCT). The picture represents kernel memory after a kernel-level rootkit
with Entry Redirection has been installed on the system. In Figure 3(a), the sys_fork system
call is unmodified. Notice, however, that system calls number three and number four point
to Trojan system calls. The trusted sys_read and sys_write are still resident in memory,
but there are no references to them. The system call table now points to trojan_read
and trojan_write. Any binary executable that relies upon the system calls sys_read and
sys_write will receive untrusted information from the Trojaned system calls.
Figure 3(c) represents kernel memory after a rootkit with Entry Overwrite has been
installed. Again, the sys_fork system call is unaltered. Notice, however, that the two
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system calls sys_read and sys_write have been overwritten. The actual code for the system
calls has been overwritten as opposed to the corresponding table entry that references the
system calls. The system call table itself is unaltered with this type of rootkit. We have not
studied an implementation of this type of rootkit. The advantage of this type of rootkit is
that a program such as kern_check [6] would not be able to detect the presence of the rootkit
as kern_check only checks the system call table, but that is only a short-lived advantage as
new tools are developed.
Figure 3(b) represents kernel memory after a rootkit with Table Redirection has been
installed. The picture depicts kernel memory for the i386 architecture and the Linux kernel.
Within the Linux kernel code exists a table called the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) that
points to kernel handlers for each interrupt. The 0x80th vector is a software interrupt that
points to the system call table. All user processes invoke a software interrupt 0x80 in order
to issue a system call [20]. When software interrupt 0x80 is invoked, the interrupt handler
for interrupt 0x80 is called, which is the system call handler. The system call handler takes
arguments from a user-space process and invokes the requested system call. The system call
handler contains a reference to the system call table, which is used to look up requested
system calls. This reference can be changed in order to redirect the entire system call table.
As Figure 3(b) shows, the entire system call table has been redirected to a Trojan system
call table. The Trojan system call table usually contains many of the same entries as the
original system call table but with a few key system calls replaced with Trojan system calls.
We have not shown how the Trojan system call table points to system calls in Figure 3(b)
as it is similar to Figure 3(a).
3.2.1 Sample Rootkits that Trojan the System Call Table
Table 3 shows a sample listing of kernel-level rootkits that we have classified in terms of their
characteristics. We show three rootkits that use Entry Redirection to Trojan the system call
table. The heroin rootkit is one of the earliest known kernel-level rootkits and is simply a
kernel module that redirects a few key system calls. The knark and adore rootkits are other
module based rootkits that redirect system call table entries.
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The second group of rootkits listed are sucKIT, zk, and r.tgz. These rootkits all use table
redirection and access kernel memory through the /dev/kmem file. The sucKIT rootkit
appears to be one of the pioneering rootkits for Table Redirection. The r.tgz rootkit was
captured on the Georgia Tech Honeynet [46].
We have not seen any kernel-level rootkits that use Table Redirection and are also kernel
modules. Similarly, we have not seen any kernel-level rootkits that target the kernel from
user space and also use Entry Redirection. We believe that future kernel-level rootkits may
redirect the software interrupt handler or the entire interrupt descriptor table, but have not
seen any rootkits to date that use this technique. Finally, we have not studied any rootkits
that use Entry Overwrite to Trojan system calls.
3.3 Device-Level Rootkit Definition
A highly specialized rootkit could target a device in the computer system. Many devices
today contain their own CPU and reprogrammable memory. For example, redundant array
of independent disks (RAID) controllers, network processors, and video cards are all devices
that can have reprogrammable memory. The software that runs the device can be updated
or changed to meet different user needs. The ability to reprogram the device for an update or
other non-malicious change also enables an attacker to reprogram the device with a rootkit
version of the device code. For instance, an attacker could reprogram a hard disk controller
with software that returns false information to the operating system about the files on the
hard disk. We call rootkits that target devices device-level rootkits.
Table 4 shows a list of possible devices that a rootkit could target. The table shows
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Table 4: List of device-level rootkit targets
Device Description
Basic Input/Output System Controller that boots up the system
Hard Disk Controller Controller that mediates access to a hard disk
RAID Controller Controller that mediates access to many hard disks
Network Card Controller that mediates access to a network
Video Card Controller that mediates access to a video monitor
Sound Card Controller that mediates access to a sound device
Other Controllers Other Controllers
Scanner Independent device that scans images
Digital Camera Independent device that takes pictures
Mobile Phone Independent device used for communication
Personal Digital Assistant Independent device used to carry information
Other Peripherals Other independent devices
two groupings of devices. The first group of devices focus on devices that are part of the
computer system and cannot function independently. The second group of devices focus
on devices that can function independently of the computer and usually communicate over
a serial bus or some other external bus. This distinction is not rigid because some RAID
Controllers have been designed to function independently from a computer. However, the
listing demonstrates that different types of devices can be connected to the computer that
are vulnerable to a rootkit attack.
The basic input/output system (BIOS) is a particularly concerning target of a rootkit. If
the BIOS has been replaced with a malicious version, then even a pristine operating system
could not be trusted. For example, an attacker could program the BIOS to bootup the
pristine operating system as normal but also instruct the computer to download malicious
software from the Internet and execute that software in parallel unbeknownst to the system
user. The network card is another example of a concerning target. Some network cards
contain multiple processors and a significant amount of RAM. If a rootkit developer has
access to such a network card, control over the network card could be easily established and
then perhaps control over the entire computer.
Other independent devices could also be the target of a rootkit. All of these devices
contain programs that interact with the operating system. So, if a rootkit is installed on
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one of these devices, then potentially the attacker could retain access to the computer system
by way of the device.
One of the important observations of device-level rootkits is that the rootkit will still
exist in the computer system even if the system administrator reformats the computer
and reinstalls the main operating system. The ability for device-level rootkits to survive a
complete reinstallation makes them particularly dangerous.
3.4 Other-Level Rootkit Definition
Other-level rootkits target a part of the system that is not considered to be at the user-
level, kernel-level, and device-level. We define this type of classification of rootkits in order
to consider future versions of rootkits. For example, in a system with a virtual machine
monitor (VMM), it is conceivable that a rootkit could be installed in the VMM. In general,
a rootkit can target any software abstractions or other state in the system that enables the
attacker to hide his or her presence.
3.5 Hybrid Rootkit Definition
Based on our survey of rootkits we have developed four classifications of rootkits: user-level,
kernel-level, device-level, and other-level. Each rootkit classification is distinctive. However,
it is also possible that one rootkit contains elements of two or more different levels. A rootkit
could, for example, contain elements of both a user-level rootkit and a kernel-level rootkit.
We call these type of rootkits hybrid rootkits.
We have captured an example of a hybrid rootkit on the Georgia Tech Honeynet [5]. On
June 1, 2003, a honeypot on the Georgia Tech Honeynet was compromised by an attacker
[46]. The honeypot was running Red Hat Linux 6.2. The attacker gained access to the ma-
chine through a vulnerability in the wu-ftpd2.6.0(1) ftp daemon. Subsequently, the attacker
installed a rootkit called r.tgz onto the honeypot. The rootkit contained elements of both a
kernel-level rootkit and a user-level rootkit.
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3.6 Methods of Rootkit Installation
In order to install a rootkit, an attacker must have root or administrative privileges on
the system. Usually, the attacker will gain root privileges on the system by exploiting a
vulnerability or use some other unauthorized means such as social engineering. Depending
on the type of rootkit and the system the rootkit is installed on, there are different methods
to install a rootkit for user-level, kernel-level, device-level, and other-level rootkits.
To install the rootkit, it must first be downloaded onto the target system. Any standard
file transfer protocol can be used to download the rootkit. After installing the rootkit, the
downloaded files are usually deleted from the system. Also, any traces of entry into the
system are deleted from the system logs. In essence, the attacker would like to remove all
indications that the system has been compromised and is now under the direct control of
the attacker. In practice, the skill of the attacker as compared to the skill of the system
administrator determines how well the attacker can stay hidden.
3.6.1 User-level Rootkit Installation
User-level rootkits can be installed by binary replacement with precompiled binaries, binary
replacement with source code, or by using the system’s package management software. How-
ever, the third case is purely speculative. The installation can be done manually or through
an automated process as part of the payload of a worm or virus. When using binary replace-
ment without source code, the attacker downloads precompiled binaries and either runs a
script or manually copies the precompiled binaries over the existing binaries.
The attacker may wish to make a hidden copy of the target binary before replacing it with
a malicious binary. The reason to make a copy is so that integrity checks of the malicious
binary can be redirected to a hidden copy of the original binary so that the system seems
intact. The rootkit must include functionality to hide the original binary and redirect checks
to the original binary.
An attacker may wish to install a rootkit on the system using the source code and
compiling the code on the target. This is often the case when the attacker does not have
precompiled binaries for a given system. It is possible that the attacker writes a custom
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rootkit for the target system and does development on that system. The only distinction
between installing a rootkit using binary replacement with source code versus binary re-
placement with precompiled binaries is that the attacker first compiles the source code.
After the source code is compiled, the installation process is the same.
As a third method to install a user-level rootkit, an attacker could use a system package
for the rootkit and install it. Many systems have package or software management tools that
manage the programs that are installed on the system. We have not verified that attackers
use the system package software, but in theory, it could be an installation method seen in
the future. In order to use the package management software, an attacker could develop a
rootkit package and install it or alternatively create a new version of an existing package
and update the existing package.
3.6.2 Kernel-Level Rootkit Installation
Kernel-level rootkits can be installed either persistently or non-persistently. In order to
install a kernel-level rootkit persistently, the attacker needs to install the rootkit in the
running kernel and modify files on disk to ensure the rootkit is active after a reboot. To
install a kernel-level rootkit non-persistently, the attacker only needs to install the rootkit
in the running kernel.
There are different methods to install a kernel-level rootkit into the running kernel de-
pending on the system. If the system does not support changes to the running kernel and
there are no vulnerabilities in the kernel that would allow it to be changed, then the attacker
cannot install a kernel-level rootkit into the running kernel. Many kernels support loading
and unloading of kernel modules, which enables one method to install a kernel-level rootkit.
An attacker can create a kernel module that, when loaded, changes the functionality of the
kernel. To change entries in the system call table, for example, the kernel module would
contain replacement entries for the system call table and, upon being loaded into memory,
would change the kernel’s system call table entries.
Similar to user-level rootkits, kernel modules can be either copied to the target system or
compiled on the target system. It is more likely necessary to compile a kernel module than
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to compile a user program. The reason is that kernels vary more from system to system,
but user programs are less varying. A kernel module is heavily dependent on the running
kernel.
Another method of installation that exists on Linux based system up through Linux
2.6.13 is to install the rootkit through a device file such as /dev/kmem. The /dev/kmem
file is a special file that gives the root user read and write access to the kernel memory
through file I/O primitives. The virtual memory of the kernel is addressable through seek
operations. Using these primitives, an attacker can locate kernel data structures, such as
the system call table or virtual file system structures, and modify those data structures
to point to malicious code. In order to allocate new memory in the kernel, it is possible
to point an unused system call to the kernel memory allocator function kmalloc. Then, a
user process can issue a system call kmalloc to allocate kernel memory and then copy over
malicious code. Using these basic techniques, an attacker can install many different types
of kernel-level rootkits onto the target system. These specific techniques will not work on
all system but other similar techniques may exist depending on the system implementation.
More generally, methods to install a kernel-level rootkit include:
• DMA — These type of kernel-level rootkits could patch running kernel code with
malicious code by programming an attached hardware device to use direct memory
access (DMA) to modify kernel code. The concept was introduced in [56], but we have
not seen any implementations.
• Swapped-out Pages — With root-level access, the attacker may have raw access to
attached hard disks. Memory pages are swapped to the hard disk when memory
becomes full. An attacker could use raw hard disk I/O to modify swapped out pages
in order to target the kernel. Normally the kernel code is never swapped to the disk,
but an attacker could use indirect means to target the kernel through swapped out
pages.
• Local Image — The kernel image resides as a binary file on the file system. The
attacker can modify the kernel image on disk and replace trusted code with Trojaned
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code. The next time the system is rebooted, the Trojaned kernel image will be loaded
into memory, thus accomplishing the attacker’s goal without modifying the running
kernel.
• Distributed Image — The beginning of the chain of trust starts at the source code and
binary distributors. An attacker could compromise a kernel image before it is ever
installed on the system (i.e. replace code or binary files with Trojans before the kernel
is distributed). As Thompson points out, one must “trust the people who wrote the
software,” or in this case trust the people who distribute the kernel [62]. This type of
installation can be considering a Trojan horse type installation because the user would
download the image from a seemingly trustworthy site.
In order to install a rootkit persistently, the attacker needs to modify or add a file to
the hard disk. The attacker can replace a kernel module that is always loaded on bootup
with a module that installs the rootkit. The attacker can add a malicious kernel module to
be loaded at bootup. Alternatively on a Linux system, the attacker can modify a start-up
script or program so that it issues a series of file I/O operations on the /dev/kmem device
file. There are many different ways to install a kernel-level rootkit and the exact details will
depend on the target system.
3.6.3 Device-Level Rootkit Installation
We have not seen many device-level rootkits in use but predict that they will be a problem
in the future. The method of installing a device-level rootkit is very rigid as opposed to
installing a user-level or kernel-level rootkit. The firmware on most devices that can be
upgraded must be upgraded by a special flash operation. The protocol for this operation
is specific to the device but typically consists of copying the new firmware image into the
executable memory of the device one byte at a time from start to finish. It is not usually
possible to do a partial upgrade and any mistake in the firmware code can result in significant
damage to the system. Repair may involve sending the device back to the manufacturer to
reload the firmware.
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Independent peripherals that connect to the computer may have either firmware or soft-
ware that can be changed to include rootkit-like functionality. The method of installation
of these type of rootkits is to follow the communication channel to the device and install
the rootkit. One possibility, depending on the device, would be to issue a software malicious
upgrade from the main computer to the peripheral device. The malicious upgrade would
contain a rootkit.
Device-level rootkits are particularly hard to develop because each device is unique and
there are many different devices. Furthermore, the specifications of the device may not be
publicly available, so the attacker may have to reverse engineer the operations of the device
in order to design a rootkit. In the future, if device specifications become more open, then
driver development will become easier and so will device-level rootkit development.
3.6.4 Other-Level Rootkit Installation
Other-level rootkit installations will be specific to the new types of rootkits seen. In the case
of a VMM rootkit, the attacker must have access to the VMM in order to install a rootkit.
Depending on the type, it may even be necessary to have physical access to the system
in order to install a rootkit. We focuses on remote installation of rootkits for user-level,
kernel-level, and device-level methods of installation, but physical access for any of these
types and the other-level type of rootkits enables different methods of installation. With
physical access, for example, the hard disk of the computer could be removed and installed
in a different computer in order to install the rootkit.
3.7 Methods of Detection
It is widely accepted that intrusion detection systems (IDS) fall into one of three categories:
signature, anomaly, and hybrid systems as seen in Figure 4. Signature based IDSs have a
database of known malicious patterns that match activity against the database to determine
if the activity is malicious. Anomaly-based IDSs use a learning algorithm to learn what
normal activity should look like and then enter a monitor mode in which they flag unusual
activity as malicious. Hybrid IDSs combine signature and anomaly techniques.




Figure 4: Classic intrusion detection systems
activity as malicious, which is known as a false positive. It is also possible to detect malicious
activity as non-malicious, which is known as a false negative. The goal of an IDS designer
is to have no false positives and no false negatives.
Detection techniques are also classified into network and host IDSs. A network IDS
monitors network flows for signs of an intrusion or compromise of a node in the network. A
host IDS monitors activity on the host for signs of an intrusion. Rootkits can be detected
by IDSs. Typically, it is easier to detect a rootkit on the host, but it is important to ensure
the rootkit has not disabled the functionality of the host-based IDS.
In addition to signature, anomaly, and hybrid IDSs, we propose a distinguishing type
of intrusion detection called integrity based intrusion detection as seen in Figure 5. An
integrity IDS monitors for an unauthorized change in state on a host. This type of IDS
becomes particularly distinguishing when detecting rootkits. Consider that at a given time
X, the system is noted to have a given state s1 = σ. At a later time Y, an IDS can check to
see if the current state s2 = σ is equal to s1. If it is not, then an intrusion has occurred.
Perhaps an integrity IDS could be classified as a form of an anomalous IDS, but we
would prefer to distinguish integrity IDSs from anomalous IDSs. The reason we make
this distinction is that monitoring integrity is very rigid whereas monitoring for anomalous
detection is not completely rigid. We believe that integrity IDSs are the complement of
signature IDSs. A signature IDS monitors for known bad state and an integrity IDS monitors





Figure 5: Integrity-based intrusion detection systems
3.7.1 Signature-Based Rootkit Detection
Given that many attackers will use the same rootkit, it is possible to use signature detection
to detect that a rootkit has been installed. One of the most widely available tools that
checks for signs of a rootkit is known as chkrootkit [2]. The chkrootkit tool is a script that
performs a series of pattern matching on the current system for known patterns of rootkits.
For example, if the file /etc/ttyhash exists on the system, then the t0rn rootkit may be
installed. Signature based rootkit detection can indicate the installation of a rootkit but
may fail in the case of a polymorphic rootkit. Also, signature based IDSs can only detect
known rootkits or rootkits that match a signature for a known rootkit.
3.7.2 Anomaly-Based Rootkit Detection
It is possible to detect that a rootkit has been installed on the system using an anomaly host-
based IDS. One host-based anomaly IDS technique is to monitor the sequences of system
calls for programs on the computer system. After a sufficient learning period, deviations
from the normal sequences of system calls can indicate the installation of a rootkit. For
example, if the login program suddenly begins issuing network related system calls then a
rootkit may have been installed. Anomalous IDSs are helpful in detecting unknown rootkits.
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However, it is possible to have false positives and false negatives with an anomalous IDS if
the learning period is not sufficient. Further, the attacker may use a mimicry attack that
mimics the expected behavior [65].
3.7.3 Integrity-Based Rootkit Detection
Integrity-based IDSs monitor the integrity of the system state. A snapshot of the state is
stored at a known good time, which is called the known good state. It is possible to compute
hash values of the known good state in order to save storage, although storage costs continue
to decline. At a later point in time, the IDS can check to see if the current state of the
system has changed from the latest known good state. If it has, then a rootkit may have
been installed on the system.
Another way to check the integrity of the system is to verify the consistency of data
structures in the system. For example, the kernel has many different data structures that
keep track of the same objects. One data structure may be responsible for enumerating
the currently running processes via system calls while a different data structure may be
responsible for scheduling the processes for execution. If both data structures do not contain
the same processes, then an inconsistent condition has been found and a rootkit may have
been installed on the system. It is possible that a rootkit has removed a process from the
list of enumerated processes but has left the process in the scheduling queue. This would
allow the process to execute but it would not show up by the list of processes running.
Example tools that monitor the system integrity include tripwire, aide, kern_check, and
samhain [41, 1, 6, 12]. Tripwire and aide are tools that can monitor the integrity of the file
system. Kern_check and samhain are tools that can monitor the integrity of the kernel.
3.8 Methods of Recovery
If a rootkit is installed on a system, then the system can be wiped clean and reinstalled.
This method will ensure that the rootkit has been removed from the system. It is important
to ensure the entire system is reset to a known good state, which would include resetting all
the device firmware in the case of a device-level rootkit. Presently, this method is the most
widely accepted method to recover from a rootkit installation. We present new methods to
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recover from a rootkit, in the following chapters, which is more efficient and equally robust
in many situations.
3.9 Known Rootkits
There are many publicly known rootkits available on the Internet today. These publicly
available rootkits are designed for many different systems including Linux, Solaris, and
Microsoft Windows based systems. Appendix A offers a list of some of the currently used




There are many key design principles and architecture considerations when building a system
that can cope with a successful attack. An important part of recovery is detecting an
intrusion. We believe that integrity-based intrusion detection is the best type of mechanism
to incorporate into an attack recovery system because it is based on known good state.
Known good state is a key concept that is necessary for recovery. Below is a discussion of
design principles, key concepts for recovery, and methods of recovery when designing systems
that can recover from a malicious attack.
4.1 Design Principles and Architecture Overview
We describe five design principles that are specific to building systems that can cope with
malicious attacks. These design principles are simplicity, isolation, trust, visibility, and
adaptation as described below:
1. Simplicity – The system must be designed so that security mechanisms and interfaces
are as simple as possible. As the mechanisms grow in complexity, it is difficult to
ensure that the functionality meets the specification.
2. Isolation – The security mechanisms must be guaranteed to be isolated from the sys-
tem. If the system monitor is a part of the system, then a malicious attack could easily
disable the monitor.
3. Trust – The design of a self-healing system must rely on a foundation of trust. If the
software that is originally installed on a computer is not trustworthy to begin with,
then the security mechanisms have no trustworthy baseline to monitor.
4. Visibility – The security mechanisms must have visibility of the entire system. If


















Figure 6: Overview of TIKE architecture
relationships of the state for intrusion detection and recovery.
5. Adaptation – The self-healing system must balance security with performance. If the
system is completely secure but sacrifices performance to an unacceptable level, then
there will be little value in the system.
Building on these five principles we describe a system architecture that is capable of
autonomous self-repair. Figure 6 shows an overview of the self-healing architecture. In
this architecture, we propose that the core security mechanisms are made possible by what
we call a trusted immutable kernel extension (TIKE). The mechanisms are an intrusion
detection mechanism, a self-healing mechanism, and a maintainer mechanism. These three
mechanisms work together based on condition policy rules (CPR) in order to monitor for
attacks on the system and self-heal the system if a successful attack has occurred.
4.1.1 System Operation
The self-healing mechanisms must be initialized before the computer system is brought
online. First, the security mechanisms are installed on the computer system. Then, the
production operating system is installed on the system. Next, the security mechanisms es-
tablishes a known good state baseline for the production system and initialize the various
components including the scheduler, intrusion detection system, self-healer, and the main-
tainer. After the self-healing mechanisms have has been initialized, the production system
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can be brought online. Any legitimate changes to the system will be corroborated with the
maintainer, and any malicious changes should be undone and logged.
When power is turned on, the security mechanisms are first initialized. After the se-
curity mechanisms have been initialized, they verify the integrity of the production system
and begin booting it. The security mechanisms continually monitor the integrity of the pro-
duction system during the boot process and after it boots. The system should be repaired
automatically if needed. The CPU cycles are scheduled between the production machines
and the security mechanisms, which is controlled by the monitor.
The isolation of the security mechanisms is guaranteed by the virtual machine monitor
(VMM). A virtual machine is used in order to simplify the isolation. The security mech-
anisms are isolated but retain visibility of the entire production machine. The security
mechanisms can control the level of adaptation based on the current threat level.
4.1.2 Trusted Immutable Kernel Extension
The critical component of a self-healing system is the TIKE. The repairing agent resides
within the TIKE. The TIKE concept builds upon the design principles of isolation, trust,
and visibility. The TIKE is an enabling architecture that serves as an isolated safe-haven
for the security mechanisms.
The requirements of the TIKE are embedded in its name, a Trusted Immutable Kernel
Extension. Below, we describe the three core requirements of the TIKE.
• Trusted – The TIKE must report accurate information about the state of a host, which
means the information can be trusted to be true. Furthermore, the TIKE must execute
exactly as instructed and do nothing else.
• Immutable – In order for the TIKE to be trusted, it must be immutable. If an at-
tacker compromises a system, the attacker must not be able to compromise the TIKE.
Further, the attacker must not be able to disable the TIKE’s services.
• Kernel Extension – In order to monitor the entire state of the system, the TIKE must
exist at the kernel level. In order to prevent attackers from compromising the TIKE
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or disabling the TIKE, the kernel extension must be isolated from the guest operating
system kernel.
Our approach in this work for the TIKE is a virtual machine approach. The TIKE virtual
machine architecture consists of a VMM, a guest operating system, and a guest monitor.
The VMM is considered the core element of trust that is immutable.
The monitor has visibility of the guest operating system. The guest operating system
runs as a user space process under the control of the VMM and monitor and is considered the
production system. The guest operating system is considered untrusted because an attacker
may be able to gain access to the guest operating system. However, the attacker is unable
to gain access to the VMM or monitor from the guest operating system, even if he has root
access.
The assumption that the attacker is not able to gain access to the VMM or monitor
from within the guest system is an important assumption. If this assumption is false, then
the entire system collapses. The argument for this assumption is that it is much easier to
build a small virtual machine monitor and guest monitor correctly than to build a full blown
operating system correctly. The attacker only has a minimal interface to the VMM. The
only way the VMM should be accessible is via the interface it provides to the guest operating
system and with physical access to the machine.
4.1.3 Monitor Overview
Our approach to automatically repair compromised systems is a monitor that resides on the
system. The monitor consists of a scheduler, intrusion detection system (IDS), self-healing
mechanism, and a maintainer as seen in Figure 7.
4.1.4 Scheduler
Conceptually, the scheduler is a central mechanism of the monitor. It controls what runs
on the CPU including the production system, which is not show in Figure 7. Priority of
the production system, maintainer, IDS, and self-healer, is controlled by the current threat






























Figure 7: Monitor overview
nature of the monitor. If intrusions are detected, the system alert level is increased and
increased priorities are given to the IDS, maintainer, and self-healer. As time progresses
after an attack, the system alert level is slowly decreased. The production system only
controls its own slice of the CPU and cannot steal cycles from the monitor.
4.1.5 IDS
The IDS is responsible for scanning the production system for a compromise. If a compromise
has occurred, the IDS builds a report and sends it to the self-healer matching the compromise
with the condition policy rules database. The condition policy rules database contains a list
of policies describing actions that are carried out when a given condition is met. There are
two major benefits to our host-based IDS approach. First, host-based IDS’s have visibility
of the entire system. Second, it has the ability to detect compromises even if the compromise
bypasses all other security mechanisms. Not only is it possible to prevent many attacks,
but it is also possible to detect successful attacks that bypass the preventative intrusion
mechanisms.
Figure 8 shows a sample listings of condition policy rules. Each rule consists of four
elements: class – which class of attack condition, condition – specific condition within the
class, policy – a space separated list of actions to perform, and adapt – factor used to adjust
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Key – class : condition : policy : adapt
file : changed : log replace_file : 5
file : added : log delete_file : 5
net : network_dos : log shutdown_network : 10
net : shell_code : log honeynet : 15
kernel : sct_mod : log replace_sct : 15
kernel : illegal_proc : log kill_process : 15
Figure 8: Sample condition policy rules
the adaptation level. The class and condition describe the exact details of the intrusion,
such as the malicious replacement of a file.
The policy describes what action should be taken if the given condition occurs. For
example, Figure 8 shows a policy of log replace_file if the condition file changed occurs. This
policy means that the self-healer mechanism would replace the file on the guest operating
system with a known good backup and log the action taken. The log is stored on the host
system and is therefore protected.
The adapt number represents how much to increase the threat level. There are different
models to use for the adaptive method. One model is to use a simple algorithm that sets the
new threat level to the level defined by the condition policy rules. The system can have a
default maximum scanning period set by a configuration file. If an intrusion occurs, then the
corresponding adapt number is used to divide the period of scanning. In subsequent scans,
if an intrusion is not detected, then the scanning period is incremented linearly back to the
default maximum scanning period. If a second intrusion occurs after an initial intrusion,
then the current scanning period is divided by the maximum alert number.
4.1.6 Self-Healing Mechanism
The self-healing mechanism is the component responsible for repairing a system that has
been compromised. It operates on compromise events sent from the monitor and performs
any action necessary to repair the compromise event based on the condition policy rules. The
self-repairing mechanism is not scheduled unless there are outstanding compromise events
that need to be serviced.
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4.1.7 Maintainer
The maintainer is responsible for keeping a copy of the known good system state up to
date. If the system state changes due to an upgrade, then the maintainer will update the
corresponding known good state. The maintainer is a critical component of the system. It
must authenticate system updates as legitimate updates. Root access to the production
operating system and authentication access to the maintainer should be disjoint.
4.1.8 Adaptation and Performance
Under normal operations, the monitor tracks the system based on optimal timing intervals
that will have minimum impact on system performance but maintain a given level of security.
If an intrusion occurs, however, the threat level increases and the monitor will take more
CPU cycles but performance will suffer. The system has two classes of monitoring levels
that can vary on their taxing of the system depending on the exact operations performed.
At the normal level, the system just monitors the system to prevent intrusions and detect if
an intrusion has bypassed the preventative mechanisms. If an intrusion occurs, the system
moves to the threat level. In the threat level, the system begins to heavily track information
in the system such as which processes cause which states changes. Over time, the threat
level goes back to normal.
4.2 Known Good State
The known good state is the set of all possible instantaneous sets that are considered to be
good, denoted as Γ. Understanding the Γ for a system in an efficient and comprehensive
manner is a key contribution of this work. The models and methods described in this work
make a significant effort to achieve an understanding of Γ in a systematic way. Our results
are not comprehensive to the problem, but provide a significant contribution focusing on
automatic detection and removal of rootkits.
4.2.1 System Integrity
The system integrity, i, can be computed mathematically by testing the current state of the
system to determine if it is a subset of Γ. If i ⊆ Γ, then the integrity of the system is intact.
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Otherwise, i * Γ and the integrity of the system is not intact.
The state of the system consists of CPU registers, memory, disk drives, device state, and
other state. Ideally, an instantaneous snapshot of the entire state of the system could be
computed and tested. Such a method to verify state could be instrumented in hardware;
however, this may not be most efficient method to verify state in that it would be very
costly.
Alternatively, we propose that all of the state can be verified incrementally over time.
The state can be divided up into different sections called buckets. During a given amount












0 if bk * Γ
1 if bk ⊆ Γ
. (8)
If i = 1, then the integrity is intact. Otherwise, i = 0 and the integrity is not intact.
Three concepts that are important for maintaining integrity are attestation, hashing, and
re-attestation as described below:
• Attestation – The software that is installed on the system must be trusted to perform as
specified. In this work, we trust that the software vendors or developers can attest that
their software is trustworthy. It is possible that the software contains programming
errors that an attacker can take advantage of to gain access to the system. The IDS
should be able to monitor the programs to determine if an attacker has exploited such
programming bugs. Attestation focuses on the trust and Trojan horse problem in that
the software vendor or developer attests that the software does not contain a Trojan
horse.
• Hashing – A hash is a one-way function that can be computed on a state bucket
that returns a small number representing the hash of that state bucket. Hashing is
important in that it can be used to efficiently verify the integrity of state buckets.
Additionally, hashing can be used with digital signatures from the software vendor
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or developer in order to distribute software. The software vendor or developer can
digitally sign the software in order to attest the integrity of the software.
• Re-attestation – The self-healing mechanism is responsible for re-attesting the integrity
of the system after a compromise has occurred. If a rootkit is installed on the system,
then the state of system cannot be attested. The self-healing system must restore the
latest known good state and re-attest the integrity of the system. Trust is an important
concept for a system that has been compromised. Conventional wisdom states that
once a system has been compromised, it can no longer be trusted. However, the self-
healing mechanism can re-attest the integrity of the system, which will re-establish
trust in the system.
The concept of a self-healing system relies upon these three concepts. Attestation and
hashing can be used for intrusion detection. Re-attestation is used for recovery from a
successful intrusion.
4.2.2 Root Access
One of the critical elements of our design is that even if an attacker has gained root level
privileges on the guest system, he will not have access to disable the monitor. Many have
recognized the ability to separate control of the virtual machine from control of the physical
machine. For example, Chen and Noble note that in the context of virtual machines even
if the entire guest operating system is replaced, the attacker cannot disable or alter logging
information on the host operating system [25].
4.2.3 Originating Entry Point and Patch
When a system is compromised, there must be some vector into the system that allowed the
compromise. This vector could be a vulnerability in the security mechanisms on the system,
or the attacker may have tricked a system user or administrator into granting access. If the
system is successfully compromised, then the self-healing system should be able to detect
that a compromise has occurred and backtrack the source of the compromise. In the case of
a system vulnerability, the self-healing system should be able to determine what component
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of the system is vulnerable and shutdown that component until it is fixed. In the case of
social engineering, the self-healing system should alert the user that his or her account has
been compromised and require the user to update their authentication tokens.
A method to trace the originating entry point is to backtrack events that lead to a com-
promised state. King and Chen introduced a manual framework for backtracking intrusions
called BackTracker in [42]. BackTracker logs events regarding three operating system ob-
jects: processes, files, and filenames. Moreover, it keeps track of dependencies among those
system events, which reflect how these events affect each other. After a compromise has
been detected e.g. by an altered file, a human investigator runs analysis tools offline on the
logged data. The result is a graph of objects and their dependencies leading to the alteration
of the file in question (the ‘detection point’). The BackTracker tools are able to filter less
relevant dependencies to make the graph more readable for humans.
It is appealing to integrate the backtracking analysis in an automated fashion into the
monitor to automatically eliminate the vulnerability that has been used to compromise the
system. This is compelling in order to avoid a re-compromise of the healed system. IDS
data can be used to serve as a detection point for an observed compromise. We believe it is
possible to use the detection point to backtrack to the point of the compromise. However,
the details and full theoretical and practical solutions are left for future work.
One important point is that the elimination of a vulnerability, depending on how it
is eliminated, could lead to collateral damage resulting in a denial of certain services the
system is supposed to offer. For example, it might be necessary to shut down a vulnerable
service until a patch can be updated. However, there may be other ways to deal with the
vulnerability besides shutting down the service completely. The method for dealing with
the vulnerability will be a trade off between security and offering services.
4.2.4 Denial of Service
If the attacker is aware that the monitor is on the system, then he or she may consider ways
to use the adaptive nature of the monitor to cause denial of service on the host. This must
be considered when building the monitor. The general approach we offer to this problem
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is that it can be handled by the adaptive nature of the system. When the adaptive level
increases, the monitor can become more aggressive in how it responds to system events.
The monitor should eventually learn exactly what processes the attacker owns and kill those
processes, thus removing the attackers ability to control any aspect of the system. These
details are also left for future work.
4.2.5 Statehold
Secure storage is a requirement for maintaining a copy of the known good state for a self-
healing system. The reasoning is deduced from understanding the case in which secure
storage is not available. In such a case, the attacker can compromise the system and also
gain access to the known good state data. With this access, the attacker can easily change
state in the system and also change the corresponding state in the known good state data to
match his or her changes. In this case, the integrity of the system would appear to be valid
because the known good state data would match the current state of the system. Thus,
the known good state must be stored in isolated storage that is not accessible from the
production machine even with complete access to that system. We call the secure storage
in our system the statehold, which is a stronghold that can store known good state.
4.3 User Recovery
User recovery focuses on recovering from compromises that occur in user space. User space
includes user applications, user data, operating system applications, and operating system
data. The state associated with user space includes the file system and memory for processes.
Although allocation of this state is mediated through the kernel, user space applications are
often given full control over the state. The operating system as a whole is responsible
for maintaining the policies of the system, and in many system architectures, this policy
is enforced by user space extensions of the operating system. User-level rootkits typically
target files on the hard disk as this is the easiest target. Below we discuss the details of
how to recover from known and unknown user-level rootkits and a discussion of the details
of different user space challenges and recovery methods.
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4.3.1 File system
In our approach, the file system is key for monitoring and recovering from user-level rootk-
its. The file system contains many different types of state organized into files that can be
monitored. The types include both user and system files. Specific types of files include
executable binaries, data files, database files, configuration files, password files, key chains,
secret keys, user right files, temp files, and registry files. Some of these files are fairly easy
to monitor and can be monitored based our our attestation and hashing approach. Other
files require more concern. Table 5 provides a list of different files and their difficult in mon-
itoring them for recovery. The executable file types, including libraries and modules, are the
easiest types of files to monitor. They should not change unless a non-malicious software
upgrade is performed. The more difficult types of files include data files, configuration files,
communication files, and temporary files. These files are more difficult to monitor because
of their dynamic nature.
Figure 9 shows a model of a dependency graph for the different types of user space state.
The subscript of each node name denotes the verification difficulty, which is one of h, m, or
l that maps to high, medium, or low respectively. In our model, the non-executable objects
all depend on the executable objects for state manipulation. This dependency is shown
with the solid arrows coming from the group of executable objects executel, libraryl, and
modulel. The contents of a file in any of the non-executable objects is controlled through the
executable objects. Therefore, if we can verify the integrity of the executable objects, then
the state changes made to the non-executable objects can also be verified. This observation
is interesting because the executable objects may be easier to verify than the non-executable
objects.
Verifying the executable objects is not a complete solution, however, as there is feedback
into the flow of the executable objects from the non-executable objects. For example, a
configuration file may be changed so that the executable objects now allow an unauthorized
user access to the system. This feedback loop is shown with the dotted arrows that feedback
into the executable objects. A key observation in our work is that a true rootkit must
change an executable object in order to hide itself. Therefore, monitoring the integrity of
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Table 5: Difficulty of measuring integrity of different types of files
Type Description Difficulty
Executable Binary files that are executable. These may
include operating system files and user appli-
cations.
low
Executable Library Binary files that are executable files may de-
pend on. These files contain code that may be
executed.
low
Kernel Modules Binary files that may be inserted into the ker-
nel for execution.
low
Data Binary or ASCII files that contain user data.
These files are not independently executable.
high
Security Binary or ASCII files that contain system se-
curity sensitive information such as passwords,
keys, or permissions.
medium
Configuration Binary or ASCII files that allow the user to
configure an application or the system.
high
Log Binary or ASCII files that log application ac-
tivity or system activity.
medium
Communication Binary or ASCII files used for communication
between processes.
high
Temporary Binary or ASCII files that are temporarily cre-
ated by processes.
high
the executable objects in user space is sufficient for detecting rootkits. However, we also
discuss some methods for recovering from attacks against the non-executable objects.
4.3.2 Executable Binaries
Executable binaries include operating system binaries such as ps, ls, and netstat and user
installed applications such as a web browser, document editor, or an email client. Further-
more, executable binaries refers to dynamically loaded libraries that link to executables and
any other type of executable object files such as kernel module files and kernel image files.
Any executable binary can be the target of a rootkit developer.
In order to recover from the installation of a user-level rootkit, a copy of the known
good binaries that is replaced must be available. This copy of the binaries should exist in
the statehold outside the reach of an attacker. A rootkit can be detected by comparing the









Figure 9: Dependency graph of user space state
In order to more efficiently monitor executable binaries, a hash of each binary is also
stored in the statehold. To test if a given binary has changed without authorization, a hash
value of the binary on the production system can be computed and compared against the
hash in the statehold. A difference in hashes means that the executable binary has changed
without authorization. Any authorized changes must be updated in the statehold.
4.3.3 Non-executable Files
Non-executable files include files that are both part of the operating system and part of user
files. These files are more difficult to monitor than the executable files due to their dynamic
nature. However, these files are the important files to protect. The user is more interested
in protecting the privacy of his or her data files than his or her operating system files. Our
approach in monitoring the user space state is to monitor the integrity of the executable
objects, which control the integrity of the non-executable objects. There are some details
that must be addressed, however, because our approach is not complete. Below are some
important details for recovery from user space rootkits.
• Configuration files describe the execution parameters of programs. Programs read
the contents of configuration files at initialization and at decision points, for example.
Some parts of configuration files may control the security of a system. For instance,
a web server configuration file may control what users can access the web server.
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Further, configurations that are not directly related to security need to be secured.
An important part of a secure system is that unauthorized users must not have access
to change the configuration.
• Security files are files that contain security sensitive tokens such as passwords or en-
cryption keys. These files are sensitive for two different reasons. The first reason is
that an attacker could retrieve the passwords or keys needed to log in to the machine.
The second reason is that the attacker could add or change the contents of these type
of files to retain access.
• Log files report a log of activity seen on the computer. Since the attacker does not
want to be seen, he or she will often delete the contents of log files. Furthermore, many
rootkits will replace logging functionality in programs with filtered functionality. In
this way, the activity of the attacker will not show up in the log files.
• Data files represent any type of data that the users of the system may wish to store.
The data includes databases, documents, email, and media information. It is very
important to maintain the integrity and privacy of these files. These files are the most
important files to protect, but may also be the most difficult files to protect directly.
• Other files may include special files such as those used for communication or tempo-
rary files. These files are highly volatile and may be just an extension of user space
applications. They are also very difficult to monitor, but they are not necessarily as
sensitive as data files.
Based on these details, there are some important observations to make. One key observa-
tion is that if an attacker gains access to a computer system, then he or she may gain access
to the security tokens such as passwords or keys that can grant future access. Therefore,
if a successful attack occurs, then it is important to change the security tokens so that the
attacker cannot regain access to the system. An alternative design could be to move the
security tokens into the statehold. However, this decreases the flexibility of the operating
system and increases complexity in the monitor.
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Another key observation is that many types of state are highly dynamic, and tracking
the integrity of the highly dynamic state can be very difficult. However, many files do not
change very often or they may only grow in size. Log files, for instance, should always grow.
So, an anomaly-based IDS could alert the user if a log file suddenly shrinks in size. Many
complexities exist that make developing such a system difficult in practical terms.
Instead, the best theoretical approach may be to track all state changes and roll back
any state changes that are the result of an attacker. This method also quickly reaches high
levels of complexity because a legitimate state change may occur that depends on the state
change made by an attacker. Some work has been done in this area [50]. We leave the
methods and results of these problems for future work but recognize that these results are
needed in order to realize a complete self-healing system.
4.3.4 User Space Processes
In addition to the file system, some memory is also allocated to user space. This memory
makes up the user space processes, which include operating system tasks that run in user
space and user tasks. A theoretical approach to recover from compromises that attack a
running process is to track all state changes for all processes on the system. Deviations from
known good state changes would be stopped or immediately recovered from by rolling back
the state change. This approach does not scale in practical systems.
Many different host-based IDSs address the issue of user space processes. Some work
focuses on anomalies of system call traces [33, 32]. If a user space process begins executing
system calls in a sequence that deviates from the expected sequences, then the IDS takes
some form of action in response to a possible attack. These IDSs rely on a learning period
during normal operation. Other work has focused on the buffer overflow problem [26].
For example, a canary can be placed on the stack in order to make it more difficult for
an attacker to exploit a buffer overflow [26]. These different types of host-based intrusion
detection systems offer ways of detecting attacks on the user processes. These methods can
be coupled with recovery actions that terminate the process upon malicious detection and
restart the process.
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Securing a user space process can be thought of as a simple form of securing a kernel. In
this respect, many of our discussions of recovering from kernel attacks can also be applied
to user space processes. When comparing methods used in the kernel to methods that
can be used in user space, there are a few distinctions to note. There are many different
types of user space processes. Some may be similar to the kernel in terms of flexibility and
complexity, while others may be very simple to secure. Also, there are typically many user
space applications running at one time with different dependency relationships. Abstractly,
there are similarities that can be applied, but future work is needed to further clarify the
distinctions.
4.4 Kernel Recovery
In order for the production system to sustain continuous operation under the supervision
of the monitor, state in the memory must be tracked. The two main sections of memory
are the kernel space and the user space. The kernel space includes such things as a list of
running processes, the system call table, the interrupt descriptor table, file caches, modules,
core kernel code, and other structures.
4.4.1 Text
Text refers to the executable machine code that is loaded when the kernel is first instantiated.
Typically, a boot loader will load the kernel from a hard disk or other medium at bootup.
The text is the section of the kernel image that is executable. After being loaded at bootup,
the text of the kernel should not change.
Ideally, the memory that contains the text of the kernel would be marked as read/execute
only. With such an enforced policy, it would not be possible to change the text of the kernel,
so recovery of kernel text would not be necessary. However, there may be situations where
it is desirable to have read/write/execute text. These policies are more flexible, which is
one of the goals of many modern commodity operating systems.
In order to monitor the text that can be altered, a known good copy of the text must
be stored in the statehold. The text can be divided into buckets of size n, for which a hash
value of each bucket can be computed. To check a bucket, the monitor computes a hash of
55
the current bucket and checks that hash with the known good hash. If the check shows no
change, then no action is needed. If the check shows a change, then recovery is needed.
If a compromise is detected in the text of the kernel, then the text can be restored from
the latest known good state. There are a few important considerations to understand. In-
correct restoration of the text can crash the system or in the worst case destroy data on the
system. It is important to restore all of the kernel functionality at one time because rela-
tionships and dependencies between different subsystems may be altered by the installation
of a kernel-level compromise. Another issue that arises is that detection may occur during
the installation process, so it would be possible to detect only part of the compromise that
has occurred. Detecting only part of the compromise and recovering from that part can lead
to an unstable system.
In order to address these considerations, all processes related to the rootkit installation
must be terminated upon detection. If a kernel-level rootkit is detected, then all computer
activity must be ceased except for the recovery mechanisms that repair the kernel. The
recovery mechanism must not only repair detected damage, but a full scan of the kernel
must be completed. Further, if the process that initiated the damage is still active, it
must be terminated to ensure that it will not continue its installation process after normal
computer operation is resumed.
We assume that the relationships between different functionality in the kernel are not
significantly changed by the installation of a kernel-level rootkit. By significant, we mean
that restoring the text of the kernel will not be problematic. We make this assumption
because many rootkits are designed to be as similar to the system as possible, which means
that they will ideally not change the system into a state that is difficult to recover from.
If the rootkit does make recovery without rebooting significantly difficult, then recovery by
rebooting the system may be a better option. Future work must address these assumptions,
however, because the nature of rootkits is to break assumptions.
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4.4.2 Modules
Kernel modules increase flexibility in the kernel by allowing the system administrator to
insert and remove functionality. Functionality enabled by kernel modules includes device
drivers, file systems, application support, networking subsystems, and other functionality.
Such flexibility allows different code to be inserted into the kernel without rebooting the
system and loading a different kernel.
The functionality added by the kernel modules can be exploited by a kernel-level rootkit
developer, so it is important to consider recovery methods. We model a kernel module as a
small form of the kernel itself. Thus, the same techniques that are applied to the kernel can
also be extended to kernel modules.
Kernel modules exist as object files on a hard disk. When a kernel module is inserted
into the kernel part of its image is the text section, similar to the kernel. Thus, the text can
be monitored in a similar fashion.
A distinction between monitoring the text of a module and the text of the kernel is that
modules are much more flexible in that they can be inserted and removed. Therefore, it is
important for the monitor to be able to adapt to different states in the system that would
be consistent.
4.4.3 Data Structures
The data structures in the kernel may be just as important if not more important than the
text of the kernel and modules. The data structures are used to support flexible code in the
kernel. For example, the system call table is a data structure that determines what code
is executed for each system call. Some data structures define the relationships between the
executable code in the kernel.
There are different methods to monitor data structures. The simplest method is to define
all the data structures and enumerate all possible values for those data structures. Then, the
monitor could check the data structures at any point in time in order to test their integrity.
This approach is feasible for some data structures such as the system call table because the
system call table should not change often.
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A second approach is to track all changes to the data structures. At the point that a
compromise is detected, the monitor could backtrack to the point of the compromise. All
changes that are the result of the compromise could be rolled back. This approach may be
possible, but we have not studied it in much detail. We believe that the overhead would be
significant.
Another approach is to learn the different acceptable values for data structures. This is
similar to the first approach, except that it is more flexible and less rigid. We discuss this
approach in more detail in Chapter 5.
4.5 Device Recovery
Devices include any type of hardware that is connected to the computer. The integrity
of devices can affect the integrity of the computer, so it is important to consider them.
Some devices are more critical than other devices. For example, the integrity of the basic
input/output system (BIOS) is highly critical as it is responsible for system initialization. It
is possible for the BIOS to load the system into a malicious state that would be difficult to
recover from. We divide the state associated with devices into volatile state and persistent
state and discuss the recovery considerations with each below.
4.5.1 Volatile State
Volatile state includes state that is temporary or volatile. Such state can include control
registers or memory cells contained within the device. Similar to the traditional approach of
reformatting a computer system, a device could be reset to known good state. Alternatively,
the state could be tracked in a similar manner as described by the sections on user space
and kernel space. However, tracking volatile state may introduce significant performance
overhead.
4.5.2 Persistent State
Persistent state is the memory associated with the device that persists even after the com-
puter system is rebooted. Many devices have flash memory or some other type of persistent
memory that contains initialization firmware that can be upgraded. It is possible for a
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rootkit developer to develop a device-level rootkit that replaces the existing flash. In order
to recover from such an attack, a known good copy of the firmware can be maintained in the
statehold. Integrity of the firmware can be monitored, and the integrity restoration process
would be to restore the firmware to the latest known good state.
4.6 Other Recovery
Besides the user recovery, kernel recovery, and device recovery, other recovery refers to re-
covery of any other state associated with the system. This state may include CPU registers,
abstract network state, and distributed state. Particularly, the distributed state may show
signs that the machine is part of a distributed network of machines that has been compro-
mised. We believe such recovery is possible, but distributed cooperation is necessary.
4.7 Trusted Computing Base
As many people have recognized, the security of a computer system relies on the trusted
computing base. This realization is particularly important in our work because we assume
that the attacker has almost full control over the system. If the attacker has complete or full
control over the system, then the ability to detect the installation of a rootkit becomes much
more difficult. Our approach to recovering from rootkits relies on a trusted computing base
that supports the statehold. We believe that only minimal functionality should be included
in the trusted computing base in order to support the statehold and a system monitor. This





Building on the concept of an integrity-based intrusion detection system and methods of
recovery discussed in Chapter 4, we propose the concept of an intrusion recovery system
(IRS). An IRS is a system designed to detect unknown attacks and minimize the amount of
damage caused by an attack by recovering from attack very quickly. The ability to detect
an attack using an IDS is a critical part of the IRS.
IDSs have certain false positive and false negative ratios that determine their effec-
tiveness in practical usage, and they are traditionally classified into signature-based and
anomaly-based systems. Signature-based IDSs focuses on signatures of known malware.
Anomaly-based IDSs focus on detecting deviations from expected behavior based on a learn-
ing algorithm. Because an IRS builds upon an IDS, the ratios of false positives and false
negatives from the IDS are amplified in the IRS. In an IRS, the acceptable ratios of false
positives and false negatives are near zero. Ideally, the ratios are zero.
In order to meet the needs of an IRS, we propose a third classification of IDSs, which
we call integrity-based IDSs. Integrity-based IDSs watch a system to make sure that it does
not deviate from a known good state. These type of IDSs can be considered the opposite of
signature-based IDSs, which monitor for known bad state. Unlike signature-based systems,
integrity-based IDSs monitor the system to ensure that the state of the system is known
good.
In order to support an IRS, we present a system architecture called spine that is an
extension of the TIKE architecture. We specifically study how spine supports detection
and recovery from kernel-level and user-level rootkits. The architecture includes a trusted
computing base for an intrusion recovery system (IRS). The spine architecture is a multi-
tiered approach, relying on the integrity of a small µ-kernel based hypervisor for correctness
at the base level. Spine vertebrae are positioned at each level in the system in order to
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overcome the semantic gap in the understanding of system state.
We conduct a detailed study of layer V2, the layer just below the production system, in
order to investigate the advantages of the layered architecture. Specifically, we discuss the
design and implementation of an execution tracker in layer V2. The tracker relies upon a
new model to track indirect branches within a virtual machine. The ability to track indirect
branches in a guest kernel enables the detection of kernel-level rootkits because unauthorized
execution paths can be identified.
A learning algorithm can learn the dynamic relationship between control flow graphs,
which we call the dynamic control flow graph. A method is introduced to discover the
dynamic control flow graph of a running guest kernel so that all possible paths of execution
in the guest kernel can be tracked. No prior knowledge of the guest kernel is needed, and
no modifications of the source code for the guest kernel are needed. Hash values of memory
cells containing executable code can be computed in order to monitor the integrity of the
executable code. After a learning period, indirect branches that deviate from expected
execution paths can indicate the installation of a kernel-level rootkit.
Since we are using the layered architecture, a fast virtual machine monitor (VMM)
controls the guest kernel and the monitor in order to minimize the performance loss while
adding additional security. The VMM enables a monitor running in one virtual machine to
control the guest operating system in another virtual machine. The IDS in the monitor of
layer V2 can be considered a hybrid between an integrity and an anomaly-based IDS. In
addition to the detailed layer V2 discussion, we also discuss the some details of the other
layers below.
5.1 Architecture Design and Reasoning
A rootkit is designed to hide the state α, state associated with the attacker’s activities, and
the state ρ, state associated with the rootkit itself. Further, in a system with state σ, the
rootkit will conceivably modify any state in σ in order to hide the state of α and ρ. It is
noteworthy that α and ρ are subsets of σ. Given this arrangement, it is important to design





























































Figure 10: Overview of spine architecture
to verify the integrity of σ. This state is part of the trusted computing base. We believe
that a small trusted computing base is the best architecture and that a hypervisor is a good
solution to achieving a small trusted computing base.
Our trusted computing based is based on a µ-kernel, which can be considered a form of
a virtual machine monitor. Figure 10 shows an overview of the architecture. The µ-kernel
is the only component that runs in the kernel space or the privileged execution mode. It
runs directly on the hardware providing a thin interface to the guest kernel. The guest
kernel and all processes it supports, P1 through PN, run in user space at the unprivileged
execution mode. On the right side of the figure is the vertically integrated IRS. We term this
architecture the spine architecture because the components of the IRS, called the vertebrae,
seep throughout the host as noted by V0 through V4 in the figure.
We divide the state in each layer into abstract state and detailed state. Abstract state is
state that can easily be interpreted from a lower layer. Detailed state is state that is difficult
to interpret from a lower layer. Each layer is responsible for monitoring the abstract state
for the layer above it and the detailed state for its layer.
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5.1.1 Fast and Secure Virtual Machine Monitor
Three architectures that are closely related are hypervisors, VMMs, and µ-kernels. A hyper-
visor is a more general term for a small layer that runs below the operating system, directly
on the hardware, providing a method for running multiple operating systems independently
and isolated from one another. A virtual machine monitor (VMM) is a layer that runs
below an operating system that mediates privileged hardware instructions, which is a form
of a hypervisor. Also, a µ-kernel is a specific form of hypervisor that consists of a minimal
kernel that exports all system services to user space tasks, but guarantees a few minimal
requirements. We base our work on the L4 Fiasco µ-kernel, the L4Env, and L4Linux [4, 7, 9].
The combination of these three software components is similar enough to a virtual machine
architecture that we generalize our discussion to the virtual machine realm but discuss some
distinctions.
Work in computer security usually relies upon some form of a trusted computing base.
The kernel in commodity operating systems could be relied upon for a trusted computing
base. However, in the case of flexible systems that allow the kernel to be modified, it is
dangerous to assume that the kernel has not been compromised. This is demonstrated by
the wide development of kernel-level rootkits. In order to help balance the needs of flexibility
and security, we present a system architecture that relies upon a small VMM for security
that still allows flexibility in the guest OS.
In order to prevent a rootkit from disabling the IRS, the IRS must be protected by
partially isolating it from the guest OS. If an attacker gains full access to a guest OS, he
or she does not have access outside of the virtual machine in which the guest OS resides.
We believe that a VMM is simple enough that isolation between virtual machines can be
guaranteed. In addition to providing security, the VMM must be fast enough to ensure the
performance loss does not outweigh the added security. In order for the VMM to be secure,
it must be well designed, very simple, and very carefully implemented. We believe that it
is possible to build such a VMM, and for the purposes of a proof of concept prototype, we
use one of many freely available existing VMMs called the L4 Fiasco µ-kernel in our work
[4]. Recent publicly developed VMMs include different implementations of L4 and the Xen
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VMM [18, 8, 48].
The VMM in our model needs to support a few performance critical design requirements.
One of the key details for the VMM is interprocess communication (IPC) support. The
VMM should support very fast IPC. Another important design requirement is the memory
mapping requirement. The guest monitor needs access to the guest kernel’s memory. More
generally, context switches on today’s hardware is very expensive, so the VMM needs to try
and minimize context switches. In the future, more hardware support for virtual machines
can drastically improve the performance of our monitoring system and could change the
performance critical design requirements.
Litty discusses the use of a hypervisor for an IDS [49]. We extend this notion for our IRS
system and further specify the requirements. First, we believe that the hypervisor should
provide minimal mechanisms sufficient to guarantee isolation and not sacrifice significant
performance. One hypervisor that meets these requirements is a µ-kernel, which is a form
of a virtual machine monitor (VMM). The performance of µ-kernels has been of debate in
past literature [19, 29, 48]. Liedtke discusses how µ-kernels can achieve good performance
and that beliefs to the contrary are not necessarily true [48]. Further, Liedtke suggest three
minimal requirements for a µ-kernel in [48] as described below.
• Address Space: The µ-kernel is responsible for managing address spaces. Three op-
erations grant, map, and flush are described so that memory can be managed with
good flexibility. The µ-kernel must enforce this management so as to protect its own
address space; however, the µ-kernel can grant or map memory to a user space memory
manager and flush access rights if necessary.
• Threads and Interprocess Communication: Threads are tied to address spaces, and so
basic thread support must be handled by the µ-kernel. Further, cross-address-space
communication must also be handled by the µ-kernel.
• Unique Identifiers: Each task must have a unique identification for efficient commu-
nication.
One of our assumptions is that V0 and V1 will not be compromised by the attacker. The
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V0 layer exists in hardware, which may be possible to verify as operating correctly [23]. It is
more difficult to prove V1 is immutable and correct; however, we have designed the system
toward the goal of achieving this immutability from the perspective of the guest system.
The reasoning of how our approach can reach this goal is deduced from code size, simplicity,
and limited interface. The code size of the µ-kernel is small, on the order of 20,000 lines of
code. Further, we believe the µ-kernel is as simple as possible while achieving reasonable
performance and strict isolation. Finally, there is a small interface that the µ-kernel provides
to tasks, which is on the order of 10 system calls.
Although we base our architecture on Liedtke’s suggested minimal requirements for a
µ-kernel, we add one addition requirement as described below.
• Task Control: Task control includes the ability to inspect and modify another task’s
control block, which includes CPU registers. Specifically, it is important to be able
to inspect another task’s program counter and the value of any registers that can be
altered based on input from untrustworthy information flows. The V1 layer should
export this system call to the V2 layer so that the V2 layer can verify that the guest
kernel is operating correctly.
5.1.2 Statehold
The statehold must be provided by a layer below V3. In our work, layer V2 provides the
statehold for the IRS. This storage is used for storing a copy of the known good state, called
Γ, for the entire guest system. For reasoning, consider this mechanism was not provided.
Then, the Γ must be stored within the guest system as a subset of the state σ. Now, since Γ
is a subset of σ, a rootkit would be able to hide itself by modifying Γ, what the IRS system
considers to be known good state.
Each higher level in the IRS system requires read access to Γ in order to verify the
integrity of its realm. V2 can map Γ to the address space of itself, V3, and V4 in order
to achieve this goal. V2 must have access to an isolated storage disk in order to maintain
persistent state and for large volumes of state such as a copy of the known good file system.
A significant portion of system state is not static. Therefore, it is important to address
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a method for updating Γ. The important consideration to understand is how to authorize
updates to Γ. There must not be a direct call to update Γ from within σ without authoriza-
tion. Specifically, if an attacker gains root-level privileges within σ, he or she should not be
able to update Γ. An independent method of authorization must be supported.
We suggest four different methods of authorization. The first method is to update σ
from an independent machine in which updates are digitally signed and authenticated based
on the public key of the system that is being updated. A second method is to require any
update to σ to be performed locally at the machine based on a hardware authentication
that grants authorization. The third method is to automatically update σ using digitally
signed hash values of software upgrades. Finally, a fourth method would be a hybrid of any
of the previously three methods. Studying these methods in detail to determine the best
theoretical versus the best practical approach is left for future work.
It is conceivable that layer V2 could verify the entire state σ. However, a semantic gap
exists between V2 and σ. For example, it is difficult to interpret guest kernel data structures
(e.g. process tables) from the perspective of V2, although possible. Instead of adding this
complicated code to V2, we believe a layered IRS approach should be used.
Each vertebrae in the IRS system understands how to verify state at its level. However,
with this architecture, portions of the IRS system itself, namely V3 and V4, are vulnerable
to attack from within the guest system. Therefore, each layer of the IRS system must be
verified for integrity. We assume that V0, V1, and V2 are intact. V2 then must verify that
V3 is intact and V3 must verify that V4 is intact. V3 is also responsible for verifying state
of the guest kernel, which is difficult to interpret from V2. For example, V2 can easily verify
that the guest kernel text is correct as this is well defined, but data structures need access
to kernel functions in the guest kernel text for interpretation. Thus, V2 must be able to
verify the integrity of V3 in addition to the guest kernel.
5.1.3 Layer V4
The fifth level in the IRS is called layer V4. Layer V4 is responsible for:
• Verifying the integrity of the state in the system that cannot be easily interpreted by
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V3, V2, V1, or V0, denoted ψ.
• Repairing ψ if necessary.
• Providing an interface to the user reporting the activity observed by the IRS.
In our architecture, we implement the file system integrity in layer V4. The file system
integrity could also be implemented in layer V3. The benefits of implementing the file system
integrity in layer V4 is that the development process is much easier. Tools already exists
such as aide and tripwire that implement file system integrity checks in layer V4 [1, 41].
Theoretically, the entire system could be monitored from layer V0; however, we believe that,
practically, such a verification process would be very difficult.
5.1.4 Layer V3
The fourth level in the IRS resides in the guest kernel and is called layer V3. Layer V3 is
responsible for:
• Verifying integrity of state for V4 and for the state in the guest kernel that V2 cannot
easily interpret, denoted φ.
• Repairing V4 and φ if necessary.
The V3 layer of the IRS exists as a part of the guest kernel. Examples of state φ include
page tables, process tables, process state, and inserted modules all of which are not easily
interpreted from layer V2. Most of the hardware resources are given to the guest kernel
and use of those resources are monitored by layer V3; however, layers V1 and V2 maintain
enough control over the hardware that recovery is feasible from malicious actions taken by
the guest kernel.
5.1.5 Layer V2
The third level in the IRS is called layer V2. Layer V2 resides just above the µ-kernel. Layer
V2 is responsible for
• Providing a read interface to secure storage for higher layers.
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Figure 11: System architecture for dynamic branch tracking of guest kernel
• Verifying the integrity of the guest kernel and layer V3.
• Verify integrity of statehold.
• Repairing the guest kernel and layer V3 when the integrity is not correct.
In this work, we study layer V2 in detail and propose a new method to verify the integrity
of layer V3. Figure 11 shows an overview of the detail for layer V2. The figure shows the
VMM as a thin layer that runs directly on the physical hardware, which comes from the
overall architecture. The layer V2 monitor is running in one virtual machine while the guest
OS runs inside a separate virtual machine. The monitor is able to map the state associated
with the guest kernel into its own machine; however, the guest OS has no visibility of the
monitor or its virtual machine. The monitor receives tracking events from the VMM about
the guest OS and can control the guest OS upon detection of malicious activity. Detection of
malicious activity can be quickly recognized. Upon detection of malicious activity, recovery
actions can be executed.
Our detail of layer V2 relies on a hybrid of integrity and anomaly-based intrusion detec-
tion in which the integrity of the system is learned over time. The monitor in layer V2 can
be considered partially anomaly based because normal paths of execution are learned over
time. The monitor can also be considered partially integrity based because the executing
code is monitored to ensure the attacker has not tampered with its integrity.
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When the system is first set up, the monitor in layer V2 begins the learning phase. During
this period, the monitor learns acceptable execution paths. It is vital to ensure a kernel-
level rootkit is not installed during this initialization phase as we assume that all paths of
execution are not malicious during the learning phase. After the learning phase, the monitor
transitions to the monitor phase in which it can detect deviations from acceptable paths of
execution and recover the system in the event that an unacceptable path of execution occurs.
Further action can be taken upon rootkit detection based on security policies. Our policy
in this work is to recover from the attack and log the event. In order to support flexibility,
the monitor can support lessons at controlled points in time. During a lesson period, the
monitor reenters the learning phase and learns new paths of acceptable execution. The
authorization for a lesson period is the focus of future work.
5.1.6 Layer V1
The second level in the IRS is called layer V1. Layer V1 is responsible for:
• Providing a process control interface to layer V2.
• Verifying the integrity of layer V2.
• Verifying the integrity of devices.
• Repairing V2 if the integrity is compromised.
Layers V2, V1, and V0 are part of the trusted computing base. In our current design,
layer V1 only has minimal ability to repair layer V2 because it is assumed that V2 cannot
be compromised very easily. Checking can be conducted on layer V2 at initialization and
during run-time. Layer V1 is responsible for verifying the integrity of layer V2 and if possible
repairing layer V2 if the integrity is not intact. The statehold exists in layer V2, so if V2 has
been compromised, then the best action may be to halt the machine and alert the system
administrator. Layer V1 should have this minimal capability.
Since all device changes are mediated by layer V1, layer V1 is responsible for verifying
the integrity of devices. The known good state for devices is stored in the statehold, which
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means that devices could potentially have access to the known good state. In order to ensure
that the known good state for devices and any other state in the statehold is not tampered
with, a public/private key pair stored in tamper-proof hardware can be used to digitally
sign the state.
5.1.7 Layer V0
The bottom layer in the IRS is called layer V0. Layer V0 is responsible for:
• Providing hardware support to guarantee isolation and enhance performance.
• Verify integrity of layer V1.
The V0 layer provides hardware support necessary to meet the isolation requirements of
the system. Some have suggested that the hardware itself needs additional support to build
secure systems [47]. We also believe that the hardware should provide integrity support.
We specify that the hardware should provide integrity support for V1, in the event that
devices try to tamper with the integrity of V1. Since the hardware is at layer V0, there is
no layer below the hardware that can provide verification of the hardware. Therefore, the
hardware must be correct and trustworthy. The final specification of layer V0 we describe
is that it should provide a small tamper proof statehold to store a system key. This key
can be used to verify integrity of higher layers and the integrity of the expanded statehold
in layer V2. We believe that more specific hardware enhancements would strengthen the
design of our system, particularly from a performance perspective, and plan to explore such
enhancements in future work.
5.1.8 Integrity
Integrity chaining consists of a root link that verifies the integrity of the next link, which
verifies the integrity of the next link and so forth. As with any security, it is important to
ensure that each link in the chain is secure. Otherwise, the weakest link can be exploited.
There are two pieces of the algorithm we describe in order to verify the integrity of execution
chains. Given links C1 and C2, where C2 is a link that depends on C1, C1 must have a copy









Figure 12: Memory hierarchy
the code for C2 is intact and repair if necessary. The second part of the algorithm is to
verify that C2 is executing as expected. Our method for the second part of the verification
is to periodically monitor the scheduler to ensure the instruction pointer for C2 is executing.
In order to monitor and repair higher layers, each layer must have visibility of the layer
it is monitoring. However, the reverse is not necessary and in fact we believe should not be
allowed. A higher layer should have very limited visibility of a lower layer. Using Liedtke’s
model of granting, mapping, and flushing memory, we are able to achieve this visibility [48].
Figure 12 shows the memory hierarchy for the system. Just above the hardware layer V0,
the µ-kernel owns all memory. It maps a large portion of the memory to layer V2, keeping
some memory for data structures such as page tables. It is important that the memory
distributions are mappings, as opposed to grants, in order to retain visibility. Next, layer V2
uses part of main memory for the statehold and maps the rest of the memory to the guest
kernel. The guest kernel in turn can in turn map portions of its memory, represented by the
dotted lines pointing to P1 and PN, to processes. Note that the guest kernel maps a portion
of its memory to the V4 process. Thus, there is a chain of mappings from V1 through V4 so
that the IRS has visibility over the entire system.
5.1.9 Learning
We assume that the integrity of the computer system is intact when the system is first
booted and initialized. Based on this assumption, we propose the use of a learning algorithm
after system initialization in which the IRS learns the acceptable states that determine the
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integrity of the system. The learning algorithm should quickly learn acceptable states for
the computer so that the initial learning period is short. In the case of systems that are
widely deployed, a learning algorithm could be a part of the software development process
in which a known good state file is distributed with the software. Upon installation into
the system, the known good state file could be copied into the statehold assuming proper
authorization is granted. It is critical that a rootkit is not installed in the system during
the learning period.
The majority of the learning should occur at system initialization. The period can be
controlled administratively, based on a certain period of time, or automatically based on
probability that the user has extinguished all possible paths of execution. It is important to
be able to alter the system at a later point. The learning algorithm must be able to learn
legitimate system changes. The approach is to allow a lesson to be learned at a later period.
This approach requires a form of authorization that must be secure. We do not specify the
exact authorization mechanism in this work.
5.1.10 Hashing and State Buckets
The intrusion detection portion of our system relies on the ability to verify state. We
considered two approaches for this capability. The first approach is hashing comparisons
and the second approach is byte by byte comparisons. We consider the best approach of the
two is to hash the current state and compare against a hash of the known good state. The
reasoning relies on the way computer systems will be designed for foreseeable future. We
believe that memory accesses will continue to be more costly than arithmetic instructions
because arithmetic instructions do not have a high memory latency. Therefore, since the
hashing method requires roughly half as many memory accesses, hashing is a much more
efficient means to verify state. One risk is that an attacker could manipulate state such that
the hash does not change; however, this is highly unlikely for good hashing schemes.
One approach to hash all of the state in the system is to divide the state into buckets.
For a given state S, where any level L can be responsible for maintaining state S, L divides
the state S up in to N buckets. L maintains an independent hash for each bucket. Then, for
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any bucket in N, L can verify the integrity of that bucket. One of the benefits of comparing
state byte by byte is that the exact state that has changed will be detected. When hashing
the entire state S, only a binary result specifying the validity of the entire state is computed.
However, using the bucket approach, benefits of both hashing and byte by byte comparison
can be used. Using the bucket approach, the bucket that contains a state change can be
quickly identified. Then, the known good state for that bucket can be compared against the
existing state to determine exactly what state has changed.
There are a number of possibilities that arise when using the bucket algorithm to verify
state. First, consider that one of the important goals of the system is to maintain high
performance or minimize the CPU cycles consumed by the IRS. To achieve this goal, not
all of the state in the system can be verified in one sweep as performance concerns, such as
latency, would be harshly affected. By using the bucket algorithm, small sections of the state
can be verified quickly and independently. This monitoring method enables an algorithm in
which all buckets are independently and periodically checked over time. Further, in order
to thwart an adversary, a random sequence of bucket checking can be conducted so that the
adversary does not know which state will be checked next.
5.1.11 Adaptation Model
Under normal operations, the IRS should not tax the system very heavily. Most of the CPU
cycles should go to the system. However, in the event of an attack, we believe that the
IRS should receive more CPU cycles. While under attack, the most important objective
is to recover from the attack. We also believe that the likelihood of detecting intrusions
is significantly increased after the initial detection point. Based on these assumptions, we
present the algorithm in Figure 13 for monitoring the state of the system.
For simplicity, the presented algorithm shows sequential checking of buckets and repre-
sents checking at each level in the system. Under normal operations, sleep_time is set to a
reasonable rate so that performance is acceptable. However, in the event that an inconsis-
tency is detected (bad_hash()), first the consistency is repaired, second sleep_time is set to
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Figure 13: Adaptation algorithm
the system will remain at that level through BACKOFF_SCALE iterations of checking the
entire state. In the event that more inconsistencies occur, the count of iterations will be
reset to zero again. If no more inconsistencies occur, then the system will slowly back down
to the low adaptive level after (number of alert levels)*BACKOFF_SCALE iterations.
We also consider a detailed adaptation for the layer V2 monitor. One of the monitoring
methods of layer V2 is to track indirect calls in the guest kernel. In order to trade some CPU
cycles for performance, it is possible to only monitor a subset of the indirect calls issued.
A simple algorithm that maintains reasonable security and adds significant performance is
to check each indirect call with a probability of p. As the value of p decreases, the chances
of not detecting a compromise increases. However, an adaptive algorithm can be used so
that in the event of a compromise, the system will increase the monitor’s aggressiveness by
increasing the probability p of tracking a given branch. Possible reasoning would be that if
the system is attacked once, it will likely be attacked again in the near future.
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5.2 Rootkit Detection and Recovery
5.2.1 User-Level Rootkits
User-level rootkits replace system binaries, add malicious utilities, change configuration
files, delete files, or launch malicious processes. Repairing the damage done by a user-
level rootkit is not difficult if the extent of the damage is understood. We believe that the
extent of the damage can be understood if a copy of the known good state is available.
The algorithm is then to compute the differences between the known good state and the
current working state. For each difference, copy the known good state over the current
working state. This yields pairings of the form action/reaction: <file replaced>/<restore
original>, <utility added>/<remove utility>, <config change>/<restore config>, <file
deleted>/<restore original>, <malicious process>/<kill process>, and so on.
5.2.2 Kernel-Level Rootkits
Abstractly, kernel-level rootkits are similar to user-level rootkits. They replace known good
state with malicious state. However, the details of kernel-level rootkits are much more com-
plicated than user-level rootkits. Kernel-level rootkits modify running kernel code, which can
drastically effect the stability of the system. Previously seen rootkits will modify the system
call table, virtual file system, and kernel data structures. Future rootkits will likely attack
these vectors but will also conceivably hide their presence using other methods. For example,
the page table data structures could be modified to redirect the entire kernel such that static
checks against the previous kernel addresses would remain valid. For simple redirections,
the same algorithm for repairing user-level rootkits can be applied to kernel-level rootk-
its where example pairings would be: <system call redirected>/<restore original>, <vfs
redirected>/<restore original>, <malicious module inserted>/<remove module>, and so
on. However, other complications exists with kernel-level rootkits. For instance, locking
issues become important because it is necessary to make sure the kernel is not executing in
memory that is being repaired. Also, memory allocated to a malicious redirection must be
reclaimed. As for attacks such as page table redirections, these can be detected and repaired
by the V2 component. For more sophisticated structures, the V3 component can periodically
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perform consistency checking of the data structures . The extent of methods for recovery
from all kernel attacks will be the results of future work. One important complication is
highly dynamic structures.
5.2.3 Device-Level Rootkits
Device-level rootkits are also similar to user-level and kernel-level rootkits except they tar-
get state associated with devices instead of state associated with user or kernel space. The
firmware in devices is the key target to attack because state changes in firmware will persist
after a reboot and also after a reinstallation of the operating system and software appli-
cations. Thus, a known good copy of the firmware must be stored in order to recover
from a device-level rootkit. One action/reaction pair for device-level rootkits is <firmware
replaced>/<restore firmware>.
5.2.4 Other-Level Rootkits
Other types of rootkits may also exists in future systems depending on the types of systems
that are designed in the future. For example, mobile devices, distributed systems, low-
power devices, and other types of computing devices are likely to gain in popularity. To
generalize rootkit detection and recovery from these other-level rootkits, we propose that
the integrity of these devices can also be monitored. The general rootkit recovery pairing is
<state changed to malicious state>/<restore state to previous known good state>.
5.3 Layer V2 Detail: Dynamic Control Flow Graph Monitor
We have studied layer V2 in detail and present a new method to detect kernel-level rootkits.
When considering methods to detect and recover from kernel-level rootkits, one of the sim-
plest approaches would be the classic reference monitor concept in which an image of the
guest operating system (OS) runs in a virtual machine (VM). The virtual machine monitor
(VMM) intercepts and monitors all relevant system calls and memory modifications. Any
action which does not comply with a certain security policy causes the VMM to recover
from the action or shut down the guest OS and alert the system administrator [55, 21]. This
approach is clearly too inefficient since almost every machine instruction of the guest OS
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needs to be checked.
A second method to detect kernel-level rootkits could be to design a form of load sharing
in which a primary machine runs as a guest OS in the VM and a secondary machine observes
and checks all or part of the system calls in parallel. The secondary monitoring machine
can use memory mapping and tracking to observe state changes. It is still necessary to trap
or interrupt the guest OS with many machine instructions, and so the overhead is still very
high.
The third method is to not check every machine instruction but only those that are at
special points in the execution path. By checking these points, an accurate and complete
path of execution can be traced dynamically in the kernel. The secondary machine in layer
V2 can observe the run-time relationships of the control flow graphs by monitoring indirect
branches in the guest kernel. After a sufficient learning period, the layer V2 monitor can
detect deviations from the expected relationships between the control flow graphs and recover
from installations of malicious paths.
A control flow graph (CFG) is a graph that represents the possible paths of execution in
a program from a given entry point to an exit point. More specifically, we refer to a CFG
that can be traced from one entry point as a static CFG. When determining what paths of
execution the kernel can take, it would be ideal to compute one CFG for the entire kernel.
However, modern kernels are designed to be modular and use indirect branches to achieve
flexibility so that it is difficult to determine all paths of execution given one entry point. In
order to determine all possible paths of execution, we have developed a model that can track
indirect branches at run-time. Using this model, it is possible to learn all paths of execution
in a kernel. We call the set of all acceptable paths of execution the dynamic control flow
graph.
In order to determine the dynamic CFG, the monitor must be able to trace all indirect
branches. In our model, the monitor disassembles the kernel code to locate indirect branches
so that they can be be tagged for tracing. Any new targets that are the result of an indirect
branch must also be tracked in a similar manner. Figure 14 shows a simple example. The






















Figure 14: Tracking the dynamic control flow graph
could represent the initial point of execution in a guest kernel. The execution graph can
be created by starting with the entry point and tracing all paths of execution that can be
tracked statically. If any indirect branch is encountered, then that branch is tagged for
tracing. When execution reaches an indirect branch, the tag will send a message to the
monitor to track the target of that indirect branch. The key is that a target of an indirect
branch can more easily be computed at run-time.
Each box in Figure 14 represents an execution block. The boxes with a solid border can
be statically computed based on conditional and unconditional direct branch targets and
other executable instructions that are rooted from the initial entry point. The boxes drawn
with dotted lines are tracked by monitoring the execution at run-time. In the case shown,
an indirect call is being tracked with targets A and B as possible paths of execution. Several
direct branches are also tracked.
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5.3.1 Learning Period
A key point for layer V2 indirect branch tracking is that all paths of execution can be tracked
during the learning period. After a sufficient learning period, the monitor will ensure that
the guest kernel does not execute instructions that are not marked as acceptable during
the learning period. It is important to ensure that during the learning period, all paths of
execution are realized. In order to provide more flexibility, the system can support lessons
at a later point so that new acceptable paths of execution can be realized.
This execution design for layer V2 is an example of an intrusion recovery system that
uses a hybrid integrity and anomaly-based IDS for detection of attack. The learning period
falls under the anomaly component of the IDS. During the learning period, layer V2 learns
what the integrity of guest kernel should be. After the learning period, the monitor can
check for deviations from integrity and recover from these deviations.
The goal during the learning period is to build data structures that represent the rela-
tionships between all the extended execution blocks of executable code. An alternative to
learning the code relationships is to specify the relationships with a security policy. How-
ever, specifying the relationships may reduce the flexibility of the system. The goal is to
determine the dynamic control flow graph of all acceptable paths of execution. Below is an
ordered list of required items to meet that goal.
1. Executable Memory Cells — Determine which cells of memory contain code that can
possibly be executed as part of the guest kernel’s control flow graph.
2. Extended Execution Blocks — Determine sequences of executable memory cells that
contain instructions that can possibly execute.
3. Static Control Flow Graphs — Determine the extended execution blocks that make
up a static control flow graph based on an entry point.
4. Dynamic Control Flow Graph — Determine all relationships of all static control flow
graphs that determine the executable paths in the guest kernel.
79
5.3.2 Entry Points
An entry point is the first instruction in a static CFG that must be given to the monitor
in order to trace the extent of the CFG. It is important that the VMM can track any new
entry points into the guest kernel and alert the guest monitor of these new entry points.
Otherwise, an attacker could request a new entry point that is not tracked and install the
kernel-level rootkit in an untracked portion of the kernel. There are different types of entry
points to track. Below is a list of possible entry points:
• created thread — A new thread is created. The first instruction of the new thread
defines a new entry point to be tracked.
• changed thread — The instruction pointer of an existing thread is changed. The new
value of the instruction pointer defines a new entry point that needs to be tracked.
If the VMM supports an operation to change thread register contents, such events
should be passed to the guest monitor as new entry points.
• hardware handler — Some kernel code is never executed until a hardware event is
triggered. The kernel initialization code points the hardware handlers to the correct
code. On the x86 architecture, for example, the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) table
is initialized at boot. When an interrupt occurs, the hardware looks up a function
pointer in the IDT table to determine what code to execute. Each hardware handler
defines an entry point. In a VMM, hardware handlers can be abstracted away with
software, so these entry points would not necessarily exist in guest operating systems.
• software handler — If the VMM supports some other type of software handler routines,
each routine is defined to be an entry point. This entry point may be covered by the
creation of a new thread to handle the routine, but it is possible that a special VMM
event occurs when registering software handlers in which case the event would need to
be tracked.
• dynamic branch target — Targets of dynamic branches can be treated as entry points.
When a dynamic branch is encountered, the target of the dynamic branch can be sent
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to the monitor in order to track a new execution path. This is handled by the VMM.
5.3.3 Execution Block
An execution block is a sequence of instructions that should execute once the first instruction
in the block begins execution. This is distinguished from a basic block in that an execution
block can contain a call branch. Therefore, the sequence of instructions in an execution block
do not necessarily execute one after the other because a call subroutine may temporarily
divert the flow of execution. Once the sequence of instructions is started, however, all
instructions in the sequence are guaranteed to execute. Figure 14 shows how execution
blocks can be linked together to form a dynamic CFG. An execution block always ends with
a branch, which can include static branches and dynamic branches.
We define an extended execution block as a sequence of instructions that does not con-
tain an unconditional branch. A conditional branch will branch to another location if a
given condition is met. If the given condition is not met, execution will continue with the
instruction following the conditional branch instruction. Therefore, not all instructions in
an extended execution block are guaranteed to execute sequentially, but it is possible. This
type of execution block is useful for building a structure of executable memory cells as it
can save storage requirements for the data structures. We are interested in constructing a
graph of all possible paths of execution when discovering the dynamic CFG. In our imple-
mentation, these paths are built by relating extended execution blocks, as opposed to basic
blocks or execution blocks, in order to help minimize the data structure overhead.
5.3.4 Branches
Branches determine the relationship between extended execution blocks when building the
dynamic CFG. Direct branches can be computed directly from the instruction disassembly
information. For example, a direct jump may have a relative offset parameter that can be
used to compute the target of the direct jump. Indirect branches must be computed at
run-time. For instance, it can be considerably difficult to compute the target of an indirect
call that uses the value of a register for the target address. Figure 14 shows examples of
both direct and indirect branches.
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Table 6: Branches that require dynamic tracking on x86 architecture
conditional unconditional subroutine return
direct
indirect X X X
We can sub-classify branches into conditional, unconditional, subroutine, and return
branches. A conditional branch will branch to the specified target only if a given condition
is met. An unconditional branch will always jump to the specified target. A subroutine
branch will branch to the specified target with the intent that the target code will eventually
return the flow of execution back to the next instruction following the subroutine call. A
return branch returns from a subroutine call and branches to the instruction immediately
following the call instruction assuming the stack has not been corrupted.
Table 6 shows a matrix of branches that require dynamic tracking for the x86 architec-
ture. Of the eight types of branches, only three require dynamic tracking. All of the direct
branches can be traced immediately. On the x86 architecture, there are not any indirect
conditional branches and there is not a direct return instruction. Only the indirect uncon-
ditional, indirect subroutine, and indirect return branches need to be tagged for dynamic
tracking.
In order to track an indirect branch, the target of the branch must be computed and sent
to the monitor in real-time. Thus, every indirect branch must be tagged in the guest kernel
so that it may be traced. There are different methods of tagging the indirect branches. Our
implementation replaces the indirect branches with a software interrupt. When a software
interrupt is generated by a tagged branch, the handler first computes and securely stores
the target information and then executes the branch.
5.3.5 End Block and Termination Points
The end of an extended execution block is usually a branch, which will begin a new extended
execution block or terminate a path. However, there are some special instructions that also
end an execution block. For example, the undefined instruction on the x86 architecture will
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end a block. Also, there may be special instructions on the virtual architecture supported
by the VMM that end an execution block.
The end of a path in a static control flow graph is usually a return branch but can also
be one of the special instructions. The end of a path can also be an indirect unconditional
jump. Each static CFG can vary in size depending on the entry point. The dynamic control
flow graph should include all paths of execution in the kernel that begin with entry points
and end by some type of termination point.
5.3.6 Executable Memory Graph
For many standard executable file formats, such as the elf standard, the memory addresses of
executable code are encoded into the file header tables. This is also true for the guest kernel
executable that is loaded into the virtual machine in our prototype. However, kernels are
typically designed differently than many user programs. A kernel is designed to be modular
and flexible so that different execution paths are possible. A kernel module can be loaded into
memory and new execution paths can be inserted into the kernel. Furthermore, although
the text section denotes executable code, not all bytes in that section will necessarily be
executed. Our execution tracking method can show exactly which bytes in memory are
being executed by the guest kernel.
Starting with the initial entry point, memory cells containing executable instructions
are marked in the executable memory graph. Each extended execution block maps into the
memory of the guest kernel. After the learning period, the executable memory graph should
stabilize and deviations from the graph can indicate the presence of a kernel-level rootkit.
Figure 15 shows a simple example of executable memory for the guest kernel. The figure
shows a matrix of 256 memory cells. The figure depicts the graph after the monitor has
learned which cells are executable based on four entry points. It should not be possible for
cells that are not marked as trusted, by being tracked by an entry point, to be executed.
This example points out many possible scenarios that can occur during the learning period.
First, the executable code may or may not be contiguous. Second, some entry points may
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Figure 15: Memory cell graph of kernel executable code
that execution paths from different entry points overlap.
Now consider cells (D,h) through (E, a) and (M,c) through (M,k). These cells have not
been marked as trusted executable kernel code. In the figure, in fact,we have marked them
as malicious. If a new dynamic target suddenly points to these cells, then a kernel-level
rootkit may have been installed on the system.
5.3.7 Timing Sensitive and Other Special Code
It may be important to have some knowledge of the guest kernel code. Tracking dynamic
targets adds some overhead to the guest kernel execution. This can cause a problem in
special functions that may be time critical, for example. A function that is calibrating the
speed of the processor may return an incorrect result due to the extra time required to track
indirect branches. Care must be taken with similar special code.
5.3.8 Monitoring Dynamic Control Flow Graph
After the learning period, the monitoring machine switches to monitor mode. In this mode,
the dynamic CFG should not change from the expected value. A change from the expected,
or learned value, indicates that some kind of malicious activity may be occurring. This
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change will happen if a kernel-level rootkit is installed.
A simple method to monitor the dynamic CFG is to store a set of acceptable targets
for each indirect branch. Then, the monitor can track all indirect branches and ensure that
their targets exist within the set of acceptable targets. More complex monitoring methods
can be applied as well.
5.3.9 Integrity of Executable Memory
In order to maintain flexibility, a copy and hash of the executable memory must be stored in
the monitoring machine. For example, a user may wish to install a kernel module, uninstall
it, and then reinstall it at a different memory location at a later time. The kernel will have
an indirect branch that jumps to the kernel module for each different installation, which
may not be located at the same virtual memory address. Therefore, the contents of the
executable memory are a part of the target description. So, a target that jumps to one piece
of code at location X and later jumps to that same code at location Y is the same target.
It is possible to mark pages of memory as read/execute only. If there is a good reason to
mark the executable text of the main kernel or any loadable modules as read/write/execute,
then it would still be possible to verify the integrity of that code. The contents of the memory
can be periodically checked and compared against the known good state as determined from
the learning algorithm.
5.3.10 Recovery from Kernel-Level Rootkit
We consider three different possibilities to recover from a kernel-level rootkit once it has
been detected by layer V3. The IRS can repair the kernel without rebooting, restore and
reboot the guest OS, or halt the guest OS and wait for user intervention. Ideally, the IRS
would always be able to repair the kernel without rebooting the guest OS.
5.4 Experimental Implementation
Based on our design and reason, we have implemented a large portion of our design and
experimented with the performance and recovery capabilities of the system. We have lever-
aged the work of an implementation of Liedtke’s µ-kernel specification, known as Fiasco [4].
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This kernel serves as our µ-kernel. Furthermore, a port of the Linux kernel to the µ-kernel
architecture has been done [9]. We use this kernel as our guest kernel. Our implementation
has been done for the i386 architecture.
We have created basic V4, V3, V2, and V1 layers and use existing hardware for the V0
layer. The V4 component monitors the file system and has the capacity to undo illegitimate
changes and some other consistency checks for the process listing verses file system listing.
The V3 component does some minimal consistency checking. The V2 layer verifies that the
guest kernel text is not modified including data structures such as the system call table and
the virtual file system structures by monitoring the execution paths of the kernel. The V2
component also has secure storage that is completely isolated from the rest of the machine.
Layer V1 was modified to support the additional requirements of our IRS. Finally, we used
existing hardware for layer V0. We have only partially implemented the vertical integrity
checking, such as checking to make sure the V4 user space process is running and tracking
the program counter for each layer.
We have used the sha1 implementation for our hashing algorithms. This hashing algo-
rithm is used in the V2 and V4 layers. The sha1 algorithm may not be the most secure
hashing algorithm, as current unpublished investigations have claimed, but another hashing
algorithm could easily be replaced in our implementation.
Some things that we have not yet implemented include exporting the secure storage
interface to the higher layers, implementing persistent storage, and enforcing a secure boot
process. We found that some details in the system are more difficult in reality than in
theory. For instance, memory management on i386 computers is complicated by various
holes and legacy backwards compatible hardware. Although we have run into a number of
complicated issues, we do think with reasonable amount of effort it is possible to build a
mature and reliable system. Furthermore, future systems can be designed to include support
for an intrusion recovery system from the initial stages.
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5.4.1 Experimental Test System
We have implemented a prototype of the dynamic CFG tracking on an x86 based system.
The thin virtual machine monitor is based on the Fiasco implementation of the L4 µ-kernel
[8]. The guest kernel is a port of the Linux kernel to the L4 architecture, which is called
the L4Linux server [9]. All experiments and testing were conducted on a Pentium IV CPU
running at 2.53GHz with 1GB of RAM. The RAM available to the operating system was
limited to 256MB. This memory constraint enabled us to give the same amount of RAM to
the virtual machines as to the standard Linux system in order to more accurately compare
performance.
5.4.2 Learning Period
For our implementation, we control the learning period using a simple authentication mech-
anism in the IRS. The learning period is turned on after the system is first installed so that
the IRS can learn about the integrity of the system. In our experiments, we perform a series
of tasks that represents how a user would normally use the system. After the initialization,
the learning period is turned off and the monitoring period is turned on. We also support
lessons during which trusted upgrades of the system can be performed so that new integrity
can be learned by the IRS.
5.4.3 Monitoring Period
The monitor period is less performance impacting than the learning period, especially for the
V2 layer. Once the system enters the monitoring period, the production system is monitored
for possible compromises. Different layers perform different monitoring actions.
One of the main monitoring tasks of the V2 layer is to track indirect branches of the guest
kernel. The system follows a typical producer/consumer solution. All targets are queued by
the VMM thread with the corresponding branch location. The monitor machine can then
later on dequeue the target information and check for legitimate targets. If a malicious target
is found, then a kernel-level rootkit may have been installed. We have only implemented
minimal monitoring functionality that enables us to detect and recover kernel-level rootkits.
87
Basic functionality exists in the implementation to support these features.
5.4.4 Layer V4
We have implemented file system monitoring and recovery in layer V4. Using an open source
tool called aide, we are able to build a set of known good state for the file system. We then
periodically run aide to determine if files on the file system have changed. If they have
changed, then the layer V4 component rolls back the file system to the latest known good
state.
5.4.5 Layer V3
We have implemented minimal consistency checking in layer V3. Some data structures in the
kernel can be changed that would result in hidden processes, files, or network connections.
The consistency checking can ensure that data structures remain intact. We have only
implemented minimal functionality in this layer.
5.4.6 Layer V2
We have implemented extensive execution tracking in layer V2. Layer V2 also implements
the statehold, which can be used by higher layers. We have not exported the statehold
storage to higher layers in our implementation. Most of the work in layer V2 has focused on
indirect branch tracking in order to trace the dynamic control flow graph.
Indirect calls or jumps can be traced by replacing their x86 machine code with an int
instruction. The int instruction must have corresponding handler code in the kernel that
properly deals with the event. This turns out to be very convenient because the int instruc-
tion is smaller than or equal to any indirect call or jump instruction on the x86 architecture.
This means that overwriting the indirect branch will not overwrite the instruction immedi-
ately following the branch instruction.
Before overwriting the instruction, the indirect branch is redirected to an allocated region
that is also executable. This redirection is based on a hash value of the memory location.
The int handler in the kernel uses the same hash function to compute the location of the
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Figure 16: Time sequence of instructions for tracking a new target
that the target has already been tracked. If it has not been tracked, then it sends the target
to the monitor to track it. If the monitor is in the learning period, it assumes that the target
should be tracked and treats it as a new entry point.
Figure 16 shows a time sequence diagram of the learning algorithm. Any instruction that
is not an indirect branch, executes normally. The figure shows how an indirect branch is han-
dled. In our implementation, indirect branch instructions (e.g. call %eax, call *0x08(%edx),
and jmp *0x0063deef ) in the L4Linux server are replaced with the int τ instruction. The
initial entry point into the L4Linux guest kernel is the first instruction that is executed by
the process, which is the first instruction in the main() function in our implementation.
All static execution paths are traced and any indirect branches are replaced with the int
τ instruction. We have chosen a software interrupt number τ for the int instruction that
is not currently in use by Fiasco. The int τ instruction causes the guest kernel to redirect
execution into the VMM thread. We have written a custom interrupt handler for the τ
software interrupt that tracks the indirect branches.
During the learning period, the target of all indirect branches is assumed to be a non-
malicious target. Therefore, upon reaching an int τ , the guest kernel redirects execution to
the VMM thread as noted by step 1 in Figure 16. The VMM thread determines if the target
associated with the indirect branch has previously been tracked. If it has not been tracked,
a notification is sent to the guest monitor and the VMM thread sleeps. The guest monitor
89
treats the new target as a new entry point and statically analyzes the new execution paths
and replaces indirect branches. The data structures of the guest monitor are updated with
the newly tracked entry point. After completely tracking all static paths, the VMM thread
is notified to resume execution. The VMM thread then redirects the guest kernel to the
original indirect branch instruction located at the present EIP value.
Minimal overhead is required to check targets that have already been tracked. A small
penalty is incurred in order to redirect the flow of execution into the VMM thread and test
to see if the target has been tracked. It is much more expensive to track a target that has
not been previously tracked. This sequence of instructions requires a context switch and a
potentially lengthy duration of x86 decoding. The length of the decoding depends on how
many paths exists from the entry point that have not been previously tracked.
5.4.7 Layer V1
We have based our layer V1 implementation on the L4 Fiasco µ-kernel. We have modified
the kernel to support the higher layers. Most of our implementation work has focused on
adding functionality needed to support layer V2.
5.4.8 Layer V0
We have used existing hardware for layer V0. We believe that hardware support for layer





6.1 Rootkit Benchmark Suite
In order to evaluate our IRS, we have collected a suite of rootkits that include user-level
and kernel-level rootkits. The rootkits were collected from the web and from a honeynet
[11, 46]. Table 7 shows the list of user-level rootkits that we have collected for testing. The
user-level rootkits were selected in order to have a representative sample of different attacks
that can be conducted by user-level rootkits.
The 4553-invader rootkit modifies existing binaries with executable code that opens a
remote shell when the binary is executed. The ark rootkit replaces binaries, and the source
code for ark is not available. The cb-rOOtkit, flea, rootkit, and trojanit rootkits all replace
different binary files. The lrk4 and lrk5 rootkits replace binaries and include a network
sniffer in order to watch network traffic on the compromised system. The tOrn rootkit
replaces binaries and also mimics the timestamps of replaced binaries. The wu-ftpd-trojan
rootkit targets a specific server binary, namely the wu-ftpd server. Overall, we believe these
rootkits provide a representative sample of user-level rootkit functionality.
Table 7: User-level rootkits in benchmark suite
Rootkit Type Description
4553-invader User-Level Modifies binaries
ark User-Level Replace binaries; no source code available
cb-rOOtkit User-Level Replace binaries
flea User-Level Replace binaries
lrk4 User-Level replaces binaries; includes sniffer
lrk5 User-Level Later version of lrk4
rootkit User-Level Replace binaries;
tOrn User-Level Replace binaries; mimics timestamps
trojanit User-Level Replace binaries
wu-ftpd-trojan User-Level Replaces ftp server
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Table 8: Kernel-level rootkits in benchmark suite
Rootkit Type Description
adore Kernel-Level Redirects system calls
adore-ng Kernel-Level Virtual File System Layer redirection
heroin Kernel-Level Early Linux kernel-level rootkit
kbd Kernel-Level Backdoor access
kis Kernel-Level client/server rootkit
knark Kernel-Level System call table entry redirection
r.tgz Kernel/User-Level Blended rootkit captured on honeynet
rial Kernel-Level Redirects system calls
sucKIT Kernel-Level System call table redirection
zk Kernel-Level System call table redirection
Table 8 shows a list of the kernel-level rootkits included in the rootkit suite. The heroin
rootkit is believed to be one of the first publicly available kernel-level rootkits. The adore,
kbd, kis, knark, and rial rootkits all replace system calls in the system call table. The sucKIT
an zk rootkits use table redirection to rootkit the system call table. The adore-ng rootkit
targets the virtual file system layer. The r.tgz rootkit was a rootkit captured in the wild on
a honeypot [46]. We believe these rootkits represent an accurate sample of the most widely
used kernel-level rootkits.
Some of the rootkits in the suite are designed for older systems than our testing system.
We ported the functionality of these rootkits so that they worked on our new system. The
system was able to recover from the ported rootkits, which had similar functionality on the
test system as they would have on the older systems.
6.2 Results on User-Level Rootkit Recovery
In order to test recovery from the user-level rootkits, we first initialized the IRS system with
the known good state of the system. The initialization of the user-level state is on the order
of minutes as the IRS only needs to take a snapshot of the file system. After initialization,
the IRS enters the monitoring mode in which it monitors the integrity of the system. We
then tested recovery from each user-level rootkit by installing the rootkit on the system.
Figure 17 shows an example attack on the guest operating system and the automatic
self-healing process. In the attack shown, we install the lrk4 rootkit onto the guest operating
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[root@uml-guest .hacker]# cd lrk4
[root@uml-guest lrk4]# make
...
gcc killall.c -o killall
gcc find.c -o find
gcc passwd.c -o passwd
gcc chfn.c -o chfn
gcc netstat.c -o netstat
gcc login.c -o login
gcc ifconfig.c -o ifconfig
...










(a) Installing the lrk4 rootkit
Running scheduler, alert level = 1
Running aide_wrapper in run_ids()
Running chkrootkit in run_ids()
Running ids_logwatch in run_ids()
sleeping between scans...
Running scheduler, alert level = 1
Running aide_wrapper in run_ids()
Intrusion detected!
Running chkrootkit in run_ids()
Intrusion detected!
Running ids_logwatch in run_ids()
Calling self_heal().
sleeping between scans...
Running scheduler, alert level = 5
Running aide_wrapper in run_ids()
Running chkrootkit in run_ids()
Running ids_logwatch in run_ids()
sleeping between scans...
...
(b) IRS log file
**** INTRUSION DETECTED! ****
** Problem detected with file: /usr/bin/killall **
** File /usr/bin/killall modified or deleted **
...
* Going to perform:
* cp -fr –preserve=all /mnt/goodmedia/usr/bin/killall /usr/bin/killall
* cp -fr –preserve=all /mnt/goodmedia/usr/bin/find /usr/bin/find
* cp -fr –preserve=all /mnt/goodmedia/usr/bin/passwd /usr/bin/passwd
* cp -fr –preserve=all /mnt/goodmedia/usr/bin/chfn /usr/bin/chfn
...
(c) Detail of self-heal actions log
Figure 17: Recovering from a user-level rootkit installation
system. Figures 17(a) shows the rootkit installation. Figure 17(b) shows an overview of
monitor status. Figure17(c) shows the self-healing action details.
We installed all rootkits on the test system and examined the logs to determine if the
recovery was successful. Full detection and recovery from all rootkits was successful with
no false negatives or false positives. Detection of the user-level rootkits was on the order
of minutes. Many optimizations could be done on the implementation to achieve near
instantaneous detection. For example, our implementation scans the hard disk to check for
file changes. A more optimal approach would be to track system calls in order to tag files
that have changed.
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6.3 Results on Kernel-Level Rootkit Recovery
As with the user-level rootkit recovery, we first initialized the IRS with the known good
state of the system before testing recovery from kernel-level rootkits. The learning period
for the kernel is less rigid than the learning period for the file system because our algorithm
for learning the kernel requires that all subsystems of the kernel are executed. Learning the
file system, on the other hand, does not necessarily require all processes to be executed.
Figure 18 shows the results from recovering from three different rootkits. We also tested
recovery from the other rootkits in the testing benchmark. All kernel-level rootkits were
recovered from with no false positives and no false negatives. Below is a detailed explanation
of the recovery from the kernel-level rootkits seen in figure 18.
6.3.1 Recovering from knark
In the first test, we install the knark rootkit. The results can be seen in Figure 18(a). The
first step is to install knark. Since knark is loaded as a kernel module, we insert knark with
the insmod command. The kernel prints a message warning that knark.o does not have an
agreeable license. The second step is to hide a binary, which we have placed in the /bin
directory, called rootme. The rootme binary is part of the knark rootkit and is used to
execute binaries with root-level permissions from a regular user account. The hidef utility
is part of the knark rootkit and is used to hide utilities. In the third step, we list files in the
/bin directory that begin with root. No files are shown indicating that our system cannot be
trusted. After installation, the IRS detects a breach of integrity and self-heals the system.
Notice that upon listing files again, the file rootme is seen. Trust has been re-established in
the compromised system. Note that during normal operation, the detection of kernel-level
rootkits happens much more quickly in our system. However, we slowed down the detection
for the purposes of demonstrating the rootkit functionality before and after repair occurred.
6.3.2 Recovering from sucKIT
In our second test, we install the sucKIT rootkit. The results can be seen in Figure 18(b).
The steps are similar to that of knark. We install the rootkit, show that some files are
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[root@h1 cd]# insmod ./knark.o
Warning: loading knark.o will taint the
kernel: no license See
http://www.tux.org/lkml/#export-tainted
for information about tainted modules
Module knark loaded, with warnings
[root@h1 cd]# ./hidef /bin/rootme
hidef.c by Creed @ #hack.se 1999 <creed
@sekure.net> Port to 2.4 by Cyberwinds
#Irc.openprojects.net 2001
[root@h1 cd]# ./ls /bin/root*
ls: /bin/root*:
No such file or directory
... <time elapse for detection and recovery> ...












BD_Init: Starting backdoor daemon...
Done, pid=1435
[root@h2 cd]# ./ls /sbin/init*
/sbin/init
/sbin/initlog
... <time elapse for detection and recovery> ...




(b) Recovering from sucKIT
[root@h3 cd]# ./all
[===== INKIT version 1.3a, Aug 20 2002 <http://www.usg.org.uk> =====]
[====== (c)oded by Inkubus inkubus@hushmail.com> Anno Domini, 2002 ======]
RK_Init: idt=0xc027a000, sct[]=0xc0248928, kmalloc()=0xc0121b88, gfp=0x15 Z_Init: Allocating
kernel-code memory...Done,
13147 bytes, base=0xc9498000 BD_Init: Starting backdoor daemon...Done, pid=1213
[root@h3 cd]# ./ps -p 1213
PID TTY TIME CMD
... <time elapse for detection and recovery> ...
[root@h3 cd]# ./ps -p 1213
PID TTY TIME CMD
1213 ? 00:00:00 all
(c) Recovering from r.tgz
Figure 18: Recovering from kernel-level rootkit installations
hidden when running the ls utility, trust is restored by the IRS, and finally we show that
the hidden files appear. The sucKIT rootkit hides files that have a certain extension, in
our case “sk12”. The initsk12 file is used in coordination with the init file to load sucKIT
upon a reboot. Trust has been re-established in a system that has been compromised with
a kernel-level rootkit that redirects the system call table.
6.3.3 Recovering from r.tgz
In our third test, we install the r.tgz rootkit. The results can be seen in Figure 18(c). This
rootkit is an example of a real-world scenario. In our scenario, an attacker has compromised

































Number of Indirect Branches
Figure 19: Indirect branches executed over time versus executable memory tracked
the r.tgz rootkit. Initially, the process is hidden, as seen by the first ps execution. Then,
the IRS recovers from the attack. Now the hidden process shows up. The IRS is able to
successfully re-established trust in a compromised system that was compromised based on
a real-world scenario.
6.4 Learning Results
We have studied the learning period for layer V2 by measuring the learning methods for the
dynamic control flow graph of the guest kernel. We did not study the learning for other
layers in much detail. Therefore, in this section, we show results of the learning period for
layer V2.
In order to speed up the learning period, we wrote a script to execute all common
tasks that would be commonly executed on a desktop system. Our results of the learning
period can be seen in Figure 19, which shows that a stair-step curve that should typical
for the learning period. The x-axis shows the number of indirect branches tracked and the
y-axis shows how many executable memory cells have been tracked. The rise in each stair
step represents significant learning periods where new activity is occurring. The first stair-
step shows the kernel initialization activity. The second stair-step occurs when user space
applications begin executing and issuing a series of system calls. The final step occurs when
we execute our script that generates typical user activity. After the final step, the learning





















Unique indirect branch instructions in L4Linux
Figure 20: Indirect branches versus unique targets observed during learning period
Figure 20 shows an important result that we have learned from the implementation. It
shows a plot of all indirect branches verses the number of different targets they take. This
graph shows how the system should operate after the learning period. If this graph changes
during execution of the guest OS, then it is likely that malicious activity is occurring. In
particular, note the spike of 100 different targets. This represents the indirect branch that is
used to execute system calls. On a system that has been infected with a kernel-level rootkit
that modifies the system call table, the number of branches tracked by that indirect branch
will increase by the number of redirected system calls.
Figure 21 shows how much memory is tracked by each entry point during the learning
period. Each new target of an indirect jump is considered a new entry point. Each integer
x value represents one entry point that is tracked. The figure shows that there are approx-
imately 475 different entry points that are tracked that vary as to how much new memory
is tracked.
Figure 22 shows the executable memory of the kernel. The dark regions indicate memory
cells that are known to have executable code based on the learning algorithm. The figure
shows the state of the graph after the learning period. There are many light regions that have
not been marked for executable regions. These regions include drivers and other subsystems
in the kernel that are not executed on the test system. Based on the learned graph, if an
indirect target suddenly targets a new section of kernel memory, then a kernel-level rootkit






































Figure 22: Executable kernel memory cells tracked by V2 (2.6 MB memory shown)
kernel-level rootkit is removed from the system.
6.5 Performance
We have done some performance analysis of our system comparing the following systems:
native Linux, L4Linux, L4Linux with spine and low adaptation, L4Linux with spine and
high adaptation. L4Linux is the guest kernel implementation that runs on top of the Fiasco
µ-kernel. All tests were conducted on a Pentium IV 3 GHz machine with 1 GB of memory.
Although the computer contained 1 GB of memory, we only allowed the production system
to use 256 MB of memory. For the spine architecture, the remaining memory was used
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Figure 23: Relative performance in compiling Linux kernel
for the VMM and for secure storage. For the Linux system, the remaining memory was
not used. The biggest impact on performance of our system is from the kernel integrity
monitoring in layer V2. We used the 2.6 branch of L4Linux, which is not as optimized for
speed as the 2.4 branch. We expect the performance could be dramatically increased by
optimizing the L4Linux kernel implementation on top of L4.
6.5.1 Monitoring Period Performance
The first performances results we describe indicate how much performance overhead is caused
by tracking the integrity of the kernel. In these results, we do not track the dynamic control
graph, but only check the integrity of the kernel text periodically. In these results, we
compare Linux, L4Linux, L4Linux with spine during low adaptation, and L4Linux with
spine during high adaptation. All systems are based on the stable Debian Sarge distribution
[3]. Figure 23 shows the amount of time required to compile a stock Linux kernel. There is
a performance loss noticeable in this figure. A loss of 32% is incurred while the system is in
its most adaptive state. This performance loss may be acceptable given the higher degree of
assurance that the system is operating as expected. The unmodified L4Linux system incurs
a 24% performance loss.
Figure 24 shows the number of bytes transferred per second using a TCP/IP connection.
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Figure 24: Number of bytes transmitted per second
The test system acted as a TCP sink and another identical Linux system served as a TCP
source for each test. The TCP source sent packets of length 1500 with no delay for a
period of 60 seconds. There was not much performance loss from the native system as
compared to the adaptive L4Linux with spine. The difference is 3%. We expected to see
a bigger performance loss. However, our current implementation does not schedule V1-V4
with priority over networking events. Therefore, the networking code gets priority, and this
is why even the adaptive system performs well.
Our results on the integrity checking show reasonable performance. Next, we present
results on the dynamic control flow graph monitoring. In these tests, three different systems
are compared with the goal of evaluating additional overhead of the indirect branch tracker.
The three systems are referred to as Linux, L4Linux, and spine. We have not implemented
varying adaptive levels of monitoring the dynamic control flow graph in the current proto-
type. The Linux system consists of a minimal and stable Sarge Debian distribution running
a stock Linux 2.6.14.1 kernel. The L4Linux system consists of the Fiasco L4 µ-kernel and
virtual machine environment, called L4Env, and a port of the Linux 2.6.14 kernel to the
L4Env virtual machine environment. The underlying Debian distribution is the same for all
systems. The spine system consists of the L4Linux system with the added tracking capabil-
ity. We do not do any integrity tracking in these tests, so that the overhead of tracking the
100
0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2




Figure 25: SPEC CPU 2000 benchmarks comparing Linux, L4Linux, and spine
dynamic control flow graph can be assessed.
Figure 25, Table 9, and Table 10 show performance results of the spine architecture as
compared to the normal L4Linux system and the stock Linux kernel. The SPEC CPU 2000
benchmarks show virtually no difference in performance. These benchmarks are designed
to test the CPU more than the operating system, and so the results are expected. There
is slight performance degradations for L4Linux and spine with the SPEC benchmarks, but
the difference is minimal.
The lmbench benchmarks better demonstrate that a performance penalty is incurred for
running Linux on top of the L4 µ-kernel. The spine column shows a performance penalty
near 30% relative to L4Linux but has a worst case of a 74% increase in penalty. The
lmbench results show a significant performance penalty as compared to Linux, however the
Linux kernel compile time benchmark in Table 10 provides a better approximation of how
the overal system will be penalized. Table 10 shows a performance penalty of about 34% for
the spine system as compared to Linux system. It should be noted that the implementation
of spine is not optimized. We believe that the performance penalty could be as low as 10-
20% on a highly optimized system. We tested an early branch of the L4Linux kernel based
on Linux 2.4 and found that its performance penalty as compared to Linux was close to
10%. We believe that the 2.6 branch of the L4Linux kernel could be more highly optimized.
Furthermore, a system that has hardware support for our architecuture would drastically
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improve the performance.
The main factor that affects performance in the L4 architecture is interprocess com-
munication. The µ-kernel architecture introduce a significant increase in interprocess com-
munication because different functions of the operating system are separated into different
processes. These processes need to share information, which requires interprocess commu-
nication. Monolithic kernels, on the other hand, do not separate different functions into
different processes. Instead, monolithic kernels have all functions in one process. Commu-
nication can be accomplished with shared memory, which eliminates the need for expensive
interprocess communication. However, the reliability and safety of the operating system
may not be as robust in monolithic systems.
The benefits of µ-kernels is the added isolation to the system, which can improve security.
Our prototype has elements of both µ-kernels and monolithic kernels. The µ-kernel runs
directly on the hardware and separates the production system from the monitor. The
production system uses L4Linux, which can be considered a monolithic kernel running on
top of the µ-kernel. We believe our system offers a good balance between security and
performance, although more optimizations are needed.
The integrity checking is less performance intensive than the dynamic control flow graph
monitoring. Many optimizations can be made in our current implementation. For example,
target tracking for the dynamic control flow graph is currently done for every indirect call.
We could track a subset of calls during a low threat level. Based on our initial study on the
performance of the system, we do believe that an optimized system could be built that has
minimal overhead.
6.5.2 Adaptation
Figure 26 demonstrates the adaptive nature of the integrity checking. Impulses of integrity
checking are drawn over time on the x axis. Each impulse represents the initialization of an
integrity check of the system. At the point where the impulses are so rapid that the figure
appears solid, a rootkit was installed on the system. No other attacks were made against
the system during the shown time frame. The system recovers from the installation of the
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Table 9: lmbench comparison of Linux, L4Linux, and spine
Benchmark Linux L4Linux Spine units
Simple syscall: 0.4715 3.19 3.78 microseconds
Simple read: 0.6049 3.56 4.62 microseconds
Simple write: 0.5746 3.46 4.61 microseconds
Simple stat: 2.2575 7.10 9.38 microseconds
Simple fstat: 0.7957 3.62 4.19 microseconds
Simple open/close: 3.8819 14.78 22.04 microseconds
Select on 10 fd’s: 1.2585 6.61 8.84 microseconds
Select on 100 fd’s: 12.1202 9.65 12.20 microseconds
Select on 250 fd’s: 30.3049 14.57 17.14 microseconds
Select on 500 fd’s: 60.337 22.82 25.63 microseconds
Select on 10 tcp fd’s: 1.2956 6.85 9.15 microseconds
Select on 100 tcp fd’s: 13.5445 11.84 14.23 microseconds
Select on 250 tcp fd’s: 34.4013 20.07 22.60 microseconds
Select on 500 tcp fd’s: 68.8380 34.07 36.39 microseconds
Signal handler installation: 0.9774 5.15 6.62 microseconds
Signal handler overhead: 2.5824 10.44 14.43 microseconds
Pipe latency: 7.6937 25.80 41.74 microseconds
AF_UNIX sock stream latency: 13.47 42.10 73.22 microseconds
Process fork+exit: 182.6694 902.04 1152.78 microseconds
Process fork+execve: 624.8340 2161.20 2827.01 microseconds
Process fork+binsh -c: 6963.7278 12089.23 14414.23 microseconds
File tmpXXX write bandwidth: 29156 28729.00 27868.00 KBsec
Pagefaults on tmpXXX: 2.3161 10.66 14.79 microseconds
Table 10: Comparison of compile time of Linux kernel
Architecture Compile Time Relative Time
Linux 464 seconds 100%
L4Linux 576 seconds 124%





















Figure 26: Adaptation after rootkit install
rootkit. As time progresses after the attack, the system slowly adapts back to a normal level
of integrity checking. This can be seen by the lighter shades of gray seen by less integrity
impulses for a given time period.
6.6 Evaluation of Self-Healing System
Based on our design, implementation, and testing of a self-healing system we can begin to
evaluate the notion of a self-healing system. One important result is that systems should
support a method to verify their own integrity. Given that a system may be compromised,
the mechanism that verifies the integrity of the system is also subject to being compromised.
Therefore, another important result is that the mechanism that verifies the integrity of a
system should be isolated and independent of the system that it is verifying. However, we
have realized that there is significant difficulty in understanding the integrity of a system
from a completely independent perspective. Thus, a third important result is that a layered
architecture in the system can help verify the integrity of the system. Another result that
we highlight in this section is that a system should be able to recover from attacks. If it is
possible to determine that the integrity of the system has been compromised, then it should
also be possible to determine how to restore the integrity.
Our results show that self-healing systems can be built that can recover from one of the
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most difficult types of attacks, which is the installation of a rootkit. We have also seen that
a performance penalty is incurred from our design. However, our design could be optimized
with better hardware support and a more efficient implementation. We believe that the





We have presented methods to re-establish trust in a compromised system without com-
pletely reformatting and reinstalling the system. Specifically, we have focused on recovery
from rootkits that are installed on a compromised system. A rootkit breaks trust in a
computer system because it replaces system functionality with functionality that no longer
reports trustworthy information. By maintaining a trusted computing base, it is possible to
automatically detect and recover from rootkit installations so that trust can be restored to
the system. An important concept to re-establish trust is that a complete understanding of
the attack is necessary in order to restore trust, which can be understood by understanding
the integrity of the system.
The concept of a trusted computing base is vital to building self-healing systems. We have
presented an architecture that provides a trusted computing base by running the production
system inside a virtual machine. The trusted computing base consists of the virtual machine
monitor (VMM) and a system monitor that resides in a second virtual machine. The VMM
guarantees that the production machine will be isolated from the trusted computing base.
We believe that the VMM and system monitor can be built in a manner so that it would
be significantly difficult to compromise the trusted computing base. The design hinges on
only separating the necessary self-healing mechanisms from the production machine, so that
the trusted computing base is small. Using this design, the size of trusted computing base
is very small, which enables a reasonable analysis of the software for correctness.
To extend the virtual machine design, we have designed a virtual layer architecture that
consists of a user layer (V4), guest kernel layer (V3), monitor layer (V2), virtual machine
monitor layer (V1), and hardware layer (V0). Using a layered architecture, we have presented
an intrusion recovery system (IRS) that is capable of detecting and recovering from attacks.
106
We have shown how the layered architecture can increase simplicity of the monitor, increase
the security of the system, and maintain a reasonable performance.
An important part of our work is that we have shown that integrity is another class of
intrusion detection systems (IDS) that is distinctive from previous classifications of IDSs.
Previous classifications of IDSs specify that IDSs are signature-based, anomaly-based, or
hybrid-based. Our additional classification of IDSs is called integrity-based IDSs.
Under previous classifications of IDSs, integrity-based IDSs would fall under the category
of anomaly-based IDSs. However, in this work we have shown that a clear distinction exists
between anomaly-based IDSs and integrity-based IDSs. While anomaly-based IDSs learn
what normal behavior should look like and trigger anomalies from the normal behavior,
integrity-based IDSs monitor the integrity of the system in order to detect a compromise.
Integrity-based IDSs are the opposite of signature-based IDSs. While signature-based IDSs
use a database of known bad state, integrity-based IDSs use a database of known good
state. With integrity-based IDSs, we believe the ratio of false positives and the ratio of false
negatives approach zero. However, an integrity-based IDS cannot detect a compromise in
which the integrity of the system remains intact.
We have developed methods of intrusion detection that can be considered a hybrid of
anomaly and integrity-based IDSs. In our work, we have shown that a system can learn
what the integrity of the system is during an initialization phase. After the initialization
phase, the IDS enters the monitor phase in which it checks the current state of the system
against the known good state.
As a part of our host-based IDS, we have introduced a method of tracking the dynamic
control flow graph. We have focused this method on tracking the execution paths of the
guest kernel. The method is able to dynamically track paths of execution that cannot be
tracked statically within reasonable limits of complexity. We have shown that this method
can be used to detect and recover from kernel-level rootkits.
Finally, we have built a prototype of our designed system. We developed a suite of 20
user-level and kernel-level rootkits to test the effectiveness of the system. The system was
able to recover from all attacks with no false positives and no false negatives. A performance
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loss of about 30% is seen in the system, but we believe that many software optimizations
and hardware support can dramatically increase the performance of the system.
7.2 Future Work
Based on our work in building self-healing computer systems, we have identified many areas
of future research. The areas of research include secure architectures, intrusion detection,
and recovery. Below is a summary of some of the important areas of future research.
• Recovery Dependencies – In our current work, we have not studied dependency rela-
tionships of the state in the system. Future work in this area could develop models
for recovery based on dependencies in the system in order to ensure proper recovery
actions are taken.
• Detecting Entry Point – We believe that it is possible to automatically detect the point
of entry into a system. By logging enough event information, we believe that the IRS
can automatically backtrack to the point of entry in the system. This backtracking
would enable the system to prevent future attacks through the entry point.
• Integrity Future Work – We have identified integrity as a form of intrusion detec-
tion system. There are many other applications of integrity-based intrusion detection
systems that can be studied in future work.
• Dynamic Control Flow Graph Future Work – We have introduced a method to dynam-
ically track program execution in order to detect rootkits. We believe that there are
other applications of this method. For example, this method may be used to detect
buffer overflows.
• Trusted Computing Base – We believe that building a small trusted computing base
increases the security of the software. In future work, we would like to study this
problem in depth to determine if it is possible to prove or at least approach a provably
correct trusted computing base.
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• Hardware Support – We have designed and implemented our prototype for existing
hardware. We would like to study new hardware and introduce new hardware tech-
niques that can support or enhance our work.
• Performance Optimizations – In addition to hardware support, there are many soft-
ware optimizations to our existing work. We would like to study methods of optimizing




Below is a list of currently known rootkits. Many of these rootkit are known and detected
by chkrootkit as specified on their web page [2]. Many of the rootkits listed below were
downloaded from packetstorm and their descriptions are based on packetstorm’s description
[11]. These rootkits target different systems. There are likely many more rootkits in use
today that are not included in this list either because they are not widely known or are new
rootkits that have not been discovered.
Table 11: List of example rootkits
Rootkit Description
4553-invader Appends parasitic executable executable code to ELF binaries
to send a shell to a remote host
adore-0.13 LKM based rootkit that includes PROMISC flag hiding, per-
sistent file and directory hiding, process-hiding, and rootshell-
backdoor
adore-0.14 Revision to Adore
adore-0.42 Revision to Adore
adore-ng-0.31 Next Generation of Adore that modifies virtual file system
adore-ng-0.41 Revision to Adore-ng
AjaKit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
all-root LKM that gives all users root
ARK Replaces syslogd, login, ssh, ls, du, ps, pstree, killall, top, and
netstat
Anonoying Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Aquatica Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Bobkit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
cb-r00tkit Backdoors many binaries and wipes logs
darkside Hides processes and their children, hides files, manipulates
uid’s, and modifies the tcp/ip stack to hide connnections
dica Most likely a t0rn variant
dsc-rootkit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
duarawkz Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Ducoci Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
ESRK rootkit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
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Rootkit Description
falcon-ssh-diffs Diffs between a normal ssh server and a rootkited ssh server
FreeBSD Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Fu Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
George Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Gold2 Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
heroin One of the first kernel-level rootkits
Hidrootkit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Illogic Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
kdbv2 Modifies sys_stat and sys_getuid to allow unauthorized root
access
Kenga3 Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
kenny-rk Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
knark LKM Kernel-level rootkit that modifies system calls
linux User-level rootkit that replaces many binaries
linuxroo User-level rootkit that replaces many binaries
linspy2beta2 Keystroke logger that records TTY activity
LOC Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
lrk3 Linux rootkit version 3
lrk4 Linux rootkit version 4
lrk5 Linux rootkit version 5
lrk6 Linux rootkit version 6
lrkn Linux rootkit version n
Madalin Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Maniac-RK Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
MithRa’s Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
OpenBSD rk v1 OpenBSD rootkit
Optickit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
phide Process hiding kernel module
Pizdakit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
pop3d-trojan Rootkit version of pop3 server
rial LKM that can hide processes, files, directories, LKMs, con-
nections, and file parts
rh[67]-shaper Rootkit dtected by chkrootkit
rk Rootkit received from the wild
RK17 Rootkit dtected by chkrootkit
rkssh4 SSH rootkit
rkssh5 Revision to rkssh
rkssh5 Revision to rkssh
Romanian Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
r.tgz Rootkit retrieved from Georgia Tech Honeynet
rootedoor Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
rootkit User-level rootkit




rootkitSunOS Rootkit for Sun Solaris
RSHA Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
RST.b trojan Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
sebek LKM Key stroke logger created for honeynets
sendm-8.9.3trojan Rootkited sendmail
Shkit Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Showtee Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
shtroj2 Executes commands based on TERM environment variable
shv4 Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
Solaris Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
sucKIT Rootkit that redirects SCT via /dev/kmem
sun-5.5.1 Rootkit for Sun Solaris
tasklgt LKM that gives root to process that reads a special file in
/proc
t0rn Widely used rootkit that was used in worms
toolkit Rootkit that hides files and processes on Red Hat 9.0
trojanit Rootkit for Linux and may work on BSD
ulogin Login rootkit
Volc Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
wu-ftpd-trojan Rootkit version of wu-ftp
zaRwT Rootkit detected by chkrootkit
ZK Kernel-Level rootkit similar to sucKIT
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